Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing

We present the design, implementation and evaluation of a system, called MATRIX, developed to protect the privacy of mobile device users from location inference and sensor side-channel attacks. MATRIX gives users control and visibility over location and sensor (e.g., Accelerometers and Gyroscopes) a...

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Main Authors: Narain Sashank, Noubir Guevara
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Sciendo 2019-04-01
Series:Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2019-0020
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spelling doaj-d71ae628b7f8424f89df0dc78a89d97f2021-09-05T14:01:09ZengSciendoProceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies2299-09842019-04-0120192668710.2478/popets-2019-0020popets-2019-0020Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App SandboxingNarain Sashank0Noubir Guevara1College of Computer and Information Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USACollege of Computer and Information Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USAWe present the design, implementation and evaluation of a system, called MATRIX, developed to protect the privacy of mobile device users from location inference and sensor side-channel attacks. MATRIX gives users control and visibility over location and sensor (e.g., Accelerometers and Gyroscopes) accesses by mobile apps. It implements a PrivoScope service that audits all location and sensor accesses by apps on the device and generates real-time notifications and graphs for visualizing these accesses; and a Synthetic Location service to enable users to provide obfuscated or synthetic location trajectories or sensor traces to apps they find useful, but do not trust with their private information. The services are designed to be extensible and easy for users, hiding all of the underlying complexity from them. MATRIX also implements a Location Provider component that generates realistic privacy-preserving synthetic identities and trajectories for users by incorporating traffic information using historical data from Google Maps Directions API, and accelerations using statistical information from user driving experiments. These mobility patterns are generated by modeling/solving user schedule using a randomized linear program and modeling/solving for user driving behavior using a quadratic program. We extensively evaluated MATRIX using user studies, popular location-driven apps and machine learning techniques, and demonstrate that it is portable to most Android devices globally, is reliable, has low-overhead, and generates synthetic trajectories that are difficult to differentiate from real mobility trajectories by an adversary.https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2019-0020location privacy protectionanonymityandroid audit frameworksynthetic mobility modelslocation-based servicesmobile appsandroid
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Narain Sashank
Noubir Guevara
spellingShingle Narain Sashank
Noubir Guevara
Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
location privacy protection
anonymity
android audit framework
synthetic mobility models
location-based services
mobile apps
android
author_facet Narain Sashank
Noubir Guevara
author_sort Narain Sashank
title Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing
title_short Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing
title_full Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing
title_fullStr Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing
title_full_unstemmed Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing
title_sort mitigating location privacy attacks on mobile devices using dynamic app sandboxing
publisher Sciendo
series Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
issn 2299-0984
publishDate 2019-04-01
description We present the design, implementation and evaluation of a system, called MATRIX, developed to protect the privacy of mobile device users from location inference and sensor side-channel attacks. MATRIX gives users control and visibility over location and sensor (e.g., Accelerometers and Gyroscopes) accesses by mobile apps. It implements a PrivoScope service that audits all location and sensor accesses by apps on the device and generates real-time notifications and graphs for visualizing these accesses; and a Synthetic Location service to enable users to provide obfuscated or synthetic location trajectories or sensor traces to apps they find useful, but do not trust with their private information. The services are designed to be extensible and easy for users, hiding all of the underlying complexity from them. MATRIX also implements a Location Provider component that generates realistic privacy-preserving synthetic identities and trajectories for users by incorporating traffic information using historical data from Google Maps Directions API, and accelerations using statistical information from user driving experiments. These mobility patterns are generated by modeling/solving user schedule using a randomized linear program and modeling/solving for user driving behavior using a quadratic program. We extensively evaluated MATRIX using user studies, popular location-driven apps and machine learning techniques, and demonstrate that it is portable to most Android devices globally, is reliable, has low-overhead, and generates synthetic trajectories that are difficult to differentiate from real mobility trajectories by an adversary.
topic location privacy protection
anonymity
android audit framework
synthetic mobility models
location-based services
mobile apps
android
url https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2019-0020
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AT noubirguevara mitigatinglocationprivacyattacksonmobiledevicesusingdynamicappsandboxing
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