How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing

How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing

This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belie...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Murali RAMACHANDRAN
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of the Basque Country 2010-01-01
Series:THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science
Subjects:
knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson.
Online Access:http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/537
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spelling doaj-d4c92a136b8348edbfc8b01e316c34fc2020-11-24T21:28:33ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTHEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science0495-45482171-679X2010-01-0121218519410.1387/theoria.537537How Believing Can Fail to Be KnowingMurali RAMACHANDRANThis paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge.http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/537knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson.
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Murali RAMACHANDRAN
spellingShingle Murali RAMACHANDRAN
How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science
knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson.
author_facet Murali RAMACHANDRAN
author_sort Murali RAMACHANDRAN
title How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
title_short How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
title_full How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
title_fullStr How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
title_full_unstemmed How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
title_sort how believing can fail to be knowing
publisher University of the Basque Country
series THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science
issn 0495-4548
2171-679X
publishDate 2010-01-01
description This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge.
topic knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson.
url http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/537
work_keys_str_mv AT muraliramachandran howbelievingcanfailtobeknowing
_version_ 1725969863686488064

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