How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belie...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2010-01-01
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| Series: | THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science |
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| Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/537 |
| Summary: | This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge. |
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| ISSN: | 0495-4548 2171-679X |