A model of firm behaviour with bankruptey costs and imperfectly informed lenders
Based on Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1990), this work explores a simple model of microeconomic behaviour that incorporates the impact of asymmetric information in capital markets on firms’ optimal investment decision rules. Starting from a model of equity-constrained firms, where expected bankrupt...
Main Author: | Pedro Rui Mazeda Gil |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Coimbra University Press
2016-09-01
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Series: | Notas Económicas |
Online Access: | https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3650 |
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