Józefa Życińskiego koncepcja racjonalizmu umiarkowanego: epistemologiczna i doxalogiczna funkcja podmiotowego commitment

• Main Author: Zbigniew Liana
• Format: Article
• Language: deu
• Published: Copernicus Center Press 2020-09-01
• Series: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
• Subjects: subjective commitment; underdetermination principle; presuppositions; justification circle; principle of uncertainty; epistemic axiology; personal knowledge; temperate rationalism; pragmatic rationality; epistemology; doxalogy
• Online Access: https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/516
• ISSN: 0867-8286; 2451-0602

One of the main problems of modern rationalistic theories of science is the non-eliminability of the subjective factor in the development of science. Temperate rationalism of Newton-Smith was an attempt to solve this problem. J. Życiński developed his own version of temperate rationalism in which the subjective factor played much more substantial role. In the article I am presenting his specific idea of the personal commitment as a necessary condition for rationalism and science. In the first section I proceed to reconstruct ˙ Życiński’s argument leading him to the conclusion of this epistemological necessity. Next in the section 2 I present his idea of the epistemological uncertainty principle as a consequence of the subjective commitment. In sections 3 and 4 I explore axiological and pragmatic aspects of the Życiński solution. Finally, in the section 5 I do compare his temperate rationalism with Newton-Smith’s proposal in the context of the Polanyi’s idea of personal knowledge showing differences in their respective approach to the role of the subjective factor in science and rationalism.