Istinto e materialismo. Cabanis e Condillac a confronto

• Main Author: Serena Massimo
• Format: Article
• Language: deu
• Published: E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni 2020-08-01
• Series: Noctua
• Subjects: instinct; reflexion; sensitivity; principle of action; organisation physique
• Online Access: https://dx.doi.org/10.14640/NoctuaVII7

Cabanis’ enucleation of the notion of instinct in his Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme (1802) articulates through a critique of the use of this notion by Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, who would not have recognised the founding role of physiology in human perceptive and intellectual activity. An analysis of Cabanis’ criticism to Condillac and an investigation of the meaning attributed to the notion of instinct by both philosophers allow to individuate in this notion the expression of two different types of materialism. The different position of Cabanis and Condillac on this notion, in fact, reflects the divergence on a series of notions – e.g. reflexion, sensitivity, habitus – which can be traced back to the different aims of their investigations. In addition to highlighting this basic divergence, this paper aims to bring out – especially referring to Condillac’s Logique – some points of contact, of which Cabanis seems not to have considered, concerning the conception of the human body as ‘organisation physique’.