Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors

• Main Authors: Peiyang Su, Ying Peng, Qidan Hu, Ruwen Tan
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: MDPI AG 2020-06-01
• Series: International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
• Subjects: construction and demolition waste; information asymmetry; incentive mechanism; reciprocity
• Online Access: https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/12/4346
• ISSN: 1661-7827; 1660-4601

To solve information asymmetry, we adopted the principal-agent framework to design the incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and demolition (C&D) waste-recycling industry. By using the model of reciprocity, we analyzed how the entities’ behavioral motives affect their decisions in terms of the incentive mechanisms. The findings showed that the collector responds to their perception of the remanufacturer’s intentions. If the perception is positive, they will make more effort in the collection work. If not, less effort will be put forth. Most importantly, we found that reciprocity helps to save the remanufacturer cost in the incentive mechanisms and makes the collector choose a higher effort level in the collection work. This finding showed that reciprocity serves to solve information asymmetry. By conducting a numerical simulation, we found that although a high subsidy policy can achieve rapid improvement of recycling-supply-chain performance, it is inefficient in maintaining friendly cooperation between the remanufacturer and the collector.