Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission
In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the...
Main Authors: | Jingchun Feng, Yuting Wang, Ke Zhang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2020-10-01
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Series: | Symmetry |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/12/10/1660 |
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