Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule

Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule

We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the p...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Róbert F. Veszteg
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2017-12-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
institution formation
laboratory experiment
plurality voting
public-goods game
unanimity voting
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/52
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spelling doaj-cc2f0e17715d4c7f9c8c01cfb190e68e2020-11-25T00:21:43ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362017-12-01845210.3390/g8040052g8040052Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting RuleYukihiko Funaki0Jiawen Li1Róbert F. Veszteg2School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Nishiwaseda 1-6-1, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, JapanDepartment of Economics, Lancaster University Management School, Bailrigg, Lancaster LA1 4YX, UKSchool of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Nishiwaseda 1-6-1, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, JapanWe report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/52institution formationlaboratory experimentplurality votingpublic-goods gameunanimity voting
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Yukihiko Funaki
Jiawen Li
Róbert F. Veszteg
spellingShingle Yukihiko Funaki
Jiawen Li
Róbert F. Veszteg
Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
Games
institution formation
laboratory experiment
plurality voting
public-goods game
unanimity voting
author_facet Yukihiko Funaki
Jiawen Li
Róbert F. Veszteg
author_sort Yukihiko Funaki
title Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
title_short Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
title_full Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
title_fullStr Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
title_full_unstemmed Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
title_sort public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
publisher MDPI AG
series Games
issn 2073-4336
publishDate 2017-12-01
description We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.
topic institution formation
laboratory experiment
plurality voting
public-goods game
unanimity voting
url https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/52
work_keys_str_mv AT yukihikofunaki publicgoodsgameswithendogenousinstitutionformationexperimentalevidenceontheeffectofthevotingrule
AT jiawenli publicgoodsgameswithendogenousinstitutionformationexperimentalevidenceontheeffectofthevotingrule
AT robertfveszteg publicgoodsgameswithendogenousinstitutionformationexperimentalevidenceontheeffectofthevotingrule
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