Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms

Abstract Humans are capable of solving cooperation problems following social norms. Social norms dictate appropriate behaviour and judgement on others in response to their previous actions and reputation. Recently, the so-called leading eight norms have been identified from many potential social nor...

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Main Authors: Shirsendu Podder, Simone Righi, Károly Takács
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nature Publishing Group 2021-08-01
Series:Scientific Reports
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95130-3
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spelling doaj-c82962adf28c4fd4b8f796d9ca8fa0272021-08-22T11:26:40ZengNature Publishing GroupScientific Reports2045-23222021-08-0111111010.1038/s41598-021-95130-3Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight normsShirsendu Podder0Simone Righi1Károly Takács2Department of Computer Science, University College LondonDepartment of Economics, Ca’Foscari University of VeniceDepartment of Management and Engineering, The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping UniversityAbstract Humans are capable of solving cooperation problems following social norms. Social norms dictate appropriate behaviour and judgement on others in response to their previous actions and reputation. Recently, the so-called leading eight norms have been identified from many potential social norms that can sustain cooperation through a reputation-based indirect reciprocity mechanism. Despite indirect reciprocity being claimed to extend direct reciprocity in larger populations where direct experiences cannot be accumulated, the success of social norms have been analysed in models with global information and evolution. This study is the first to analyse the leading eight norms with local information and evolution. We find that the leading eight are robust against selfish players within most scenarios and can maintain a high level of cooperation also with local information and evolution. In fact, local evolution sustains cooperation under a wider set of conditions than global evolution, while local reputation does not hinder cooperation compared to global reputation. Four of the leading eight norms that do not reward justified defection offer better chances for cooperation with quick evolution, reputation with noise, larger networks, and when unconditional defectors enter the population.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95130-3
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Shirsendu Podder
Simone Righi
Károly Takács
spellingShingle Shirsendu Podder
Simone Righi
Károly Takács
Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms
Scientific Reports
author_facet Shirsendu Podder
Simone Righi
Károly Takács
author_sort Shirsendu Podder
title Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms
title_short Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms
title_full Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms
title_fullStr Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms
title_full_unstemmed Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms
title_sort local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms
publisher Nature Publishing Group
series Scientific Reports
issn 2045-2322
publishDate 2021-08-01
description Abstract Humans are capable of solving cooperation problems following social norms. Social norms dictate appropriate behaviour and judgement on others in response to their previous actions and reputation. Recently, the so-called leading eight norms have been identified from many potential social norms that can sustain cooperation through a reputation-based indirect reciprocity mechanism. Despite indirect reciprocity being claimed to extend direct reciprocity in larger populations where direct experiences cannot be accumulated, the success of social norms have been analysed in models with global information and evolution. This study is the first to analyse the leading eight norms with local information and evolution. We find that the leading eight are robust against selfish players within most scenarios and can maintain a high level of cooperation also with local information and evolution. In fact, local evolution sustains cooperation under a wider set of conditions than global evolution, while local reputation does not hinder cooperation compared to global reputation. Four of the leading eight norms that do not reward justified defection offer better chances for cooperation with quick evolution, reputation with noise, larger networks, and when unconditional defectors enter the population.
url https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95130-3
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