Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance

The purpose of this paper is to present a recently emerging evolutionary approach to the study of human organization that I will refer to as ‘naturalistic’, and to highlight its integrative potential for the social and administrative sciences. This naturalistic approach considers the various forms o...

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Main Author: J.W. Stoelhorst
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Bamberg Press 2017-01-01
Series:Complexity, Governance & Networks
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ubp.uni-bamberg.de/ojs/index.php/cgn/article/view/39
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spelling doaj-c4eaf1df55b34ae5a368356d0e944ba52020-11-25T01:31:02ZengUniversity of Bamberg PressComplexity, Governance & Networks2214-29912214-30092017-01-010172110.20377/cgn-3936Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic GovernanceJ.W. Stoelhorst0University of AmsterdamThe purpose of this paper is to present a recently emerging evolutionary approach to the study of human organization that I will refer to as ‘naturalistic’, and to highlight its integrative potential for the social and administrative sciences. This naturalistic approach considers the various forms of human cooperation as products of gene-culture co-evolutionary processes, and in doing so goes to the heart of the collective action problems that are central to explaining the human condition. Moreover, in building empirically grounded explanations of human behavior and organization, it also offers an alternative to the traditional view of governance in economic theory, with its emphasis on decentralized exchange and rational self-interested choice. The naturalistic approach both explains why human nature has evolved to the point where we often can do ‘better than rational’ in the face of the social dilemmas underlying collective action problems, and why modern forms of social, economic, and political organization are nevertheless always prone to being undermined by these same dilemmas.https://ubp.uni-bamberg.de/ojs/index.php/cgn/article/view/39collective actioninstitutional economicsevolutionary theorymulti-level selectiongene-culture co-evolution
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author J.W. Stoelhorst
spellingShingle J.W. Stoelhorst
Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
Complexity, Governance & Networks
collective action
institutional economics
evolutionary theory
multi-level selection
gene-culture co-evolution
author_facet J.W. Stoelhorst
author_sort J.W. Stoelhorst
title Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
title_short Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
title_full Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
title_fullStr Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
title_full_unstemmed Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
title_sort better than rational: a naturalistic view of economic governance
publisher University of Bamberg Press
series Complexity, Governance & Networks
issn 2214-2991
2214-3009
publishDate 2017-01-01
description The purpose of this paper is to present a recently emerging evolutionary approach to the study of human organization that I will refer to as ‘naturalistic’, and to highlight its integrative potential for the social and administrative sciences. This naturalistic approach considers the various forms of human cooperation as products of gene-culture co-evolutionary processes, and in doing so goes to the heart of the collective action problems that are central to explaining the human condition. Moreover, in building empirically grounded explanations of human behavior and organization, it also offers an alternative to the traditional view of governance in economic theory, with its emphasis on decentralized exchange and rational self-interested choice. The naturalistic approach both explains why human nature has evolved to the point where we often can do ‘better than rational’ in the face of the social dilemmas underlying collective action problems, and why modern forms of social, economic, and political organization are nevertheless always prone to being undermined by these same dilemmas.
topic collective action
institutional economics
evolutionary theory
multi-level selection
gene-culture co-evolution
url https://ubp.uni-bamberg.de/ojs/index.php/cgn/article/view/39
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