Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach

Service Oriented Enterprises (SOEs) are subject to constant change and variation. In this paper, the changes are considered from an economic perspective based on service culture notion. Once a change is implemented, the costs of some member services may increase, whereas the costs of some other serv...

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Main Authors: Ali Habibi Badrabadi, Mohammad Jafar Tarokh
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Iran University of Science & Technology 2009-09-01
Series:International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Production Research
Subjects:
Online Access:http://ijiepr.iust.ac.ir/browse.php?a_code=A-10-1-55&slc_lang=en&sid=1
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spelling doaj-c4e14e9f4bba41c49bcca977397db1de2020-11-24T23:47:39ZengIran University of Science & TechnologyInternational Journal of Industrial Engineering and Production Research2008-48892345-363X2009-09-01203124134Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory ApproachAli Habibi Badrabadi0Mohammad Jafar Tarokh1 Service Oriented Enterprises (SOEs) are subject to constant change and variation. In this paper, the changes are considered from an economic perspective based on service culture notion. Once a change is implemented, the costs of some member services may increase, whereas the costs of some other services may reduce. We construct a game theoretic model trying to capture the possible conflicting interests of different parties in a SOE. Three incentive mechanisms are applied to the model. The first incentive mechanism shares the utility equally among the services involved in the change the second utility-sharing rule is based on the Nash’s bargaining solution, which accommodates the possible biased interdependencies inside the network and the third rule, based on the Harsanyi’s modified Shapley value, takes into account the possible coalition formation among the network parties. Since the three rules are analytically solvable, the principles of utility sharing can be implemented, for instance, as ex-ante contracts.http://ijiepr.iust.ac.ir/browse.php?a_code=A-10-1-55&slc_lang=en&sid=1Service Oriented Enterprise Web Service Service Culture Top-Down Change Economic Analysis and Game Theory
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Ali Habibi Badrabadi
Mohammad Jafar Tarokh
spellingShingle Ali Habibi Badrabadi
Mohammad Jafar Tarokh
Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach
International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Production Research
Service Oriented Enterprise
Web Service
Service Culture
Top-Down Change
Economic Analysis
and Game Theory
author_facet Ali Habibi Badrabadi
Mohammad Jafar Tarokh
author_sort Ali Habibi Badrabadi
title Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach
title_short Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach
title_full Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach
title_fullStr Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach
title_full_unstemmed Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach
title_sort changes in a service oriented enterprise: a game theory approach
publisher Iran University of Science & Technology
series International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Production Research
issn 2008-4889
2345-363X
publishDate 2009-09-01
description Service Oriented Enterprises (SOEs) are subject to constant change and variation. In this paper, the changes are considered from an economic perspective based on service culture notion. Once a change is implemented, the costs of some member services may increase, whereas the costs of some other services may reduce. We construct a game theoretic model trying to capture the possible conflicting interests of different parties in a SOE. Three incentive mechanisms are applied to the model. The first incentive mechanism shares the utility equally among the services involved in the change the second utility-sharing rule is based on the Nash’s bargaining solution, which accommodates the possible biased interdependencies inside the network and the third rule, based on the Harsanyi’s modified Shapley value, takes into account the possible coalition formation among the network parties. Since the three rules are analytically solvable, the principles of utility sharing can be implemented, for instance, as ex-ante contracts.
topic Service Oriented Enterprise
Web Service
Service Culture
Top-Down Change
Economic Analysis
and Game Theory
url http://ijiepr.iust.ac.ir/browse.php?a_code=A-10-1-55&slc_lang=en&sid=1
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AT mohammadjafartarokh changesinaserviceorientedenterpriseagametheoryapproach
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