THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGE
In article the typological variety of types of compensation at a cedation of ownership rights or other types of a right in rem is defined and their correct reducibility to conditionally and to broad established prices presented in development on time is shown. The typological variety of the discrimi...
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2017-07-01
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doaj-c43d5a7b48074ed8bea22993df0a604c2021-10-02T06:22:33ZrusPublishing House of the State University of ManagementВестник университета1816-42772686-84152017-07-0107-8136139786THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGEN. Cherner0ФГБОУ ВО «Московский государственный институт международных отношений (Университет)», филиал в г. ОдинцовоIn article the typological variety of types of compensation at a cedation of ownership rights or other types of a right in rem is defined and their correct reducibility to conditionally and to broad established prices presented in development on time is shown. The typological variety of the discriminating signs of allocation of a special type of management is introduced and shown by what rule price management is localized. In the conceptual plan substantial filling of a special type of management - price management of organizational and institutional isolations in economy is considered in relation to modern Russian conditions.https://vestnik.guu.ru/jour/article/view/786price managementtypes of compensationorganizational and institutional isolationseconomyrule of classification |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
Russian |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
N. Cherner |
spellingShingle |
N. Cherner THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGE Вестник университета price management types of compensation organizational and institutional isolations economy rule of classification |
author_facet |
N. Cherner |
author_sort |
N. Cherner |
title |
THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGE |
title_short |
THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGE |
title_full |
THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGE |
title_fullStr |
THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGE |
title_full_unstemmed |
THEORETICAL RESEARCH OF MECHANISMS OF PRICE MANAGEMENT AT THE ENTERPRISE AT THE PRESENT STAGE |
title_sort |
theoretical research of mechanisms of price management at the enterprise at the present stage |
publisher |
Publishing House of the State University of Management |
series |
Вестник университета |
issn |
1816-4277 2686-8415 |
publishDate |
2017-07-01 |
description |
In article the typological variety of types of compensation at a cedation of ownership rights or other types of a right in rem is defined and their correct reducibility to conditionally and to broad established prices presented in development on time is shown. The typological variety of the discriminating signs of allocation of a special type of management is introduced and shown by what rule price management is localized. In the conceptual plan substantial filling of a special type of management - price management of organizational and institutional isolations in economy is considered in relation to modern Russian conditions. |
topic |
price management types of compensation organizational and institutional isolations economy rule of classification |
url |
https://vestnik.guu.ru/jour/article/view/786 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT ncherner theoreticalresearchofmechanismsofpricemanagementattheenterpriseatthepresentstage |
_version_ |
1716858249837281280 |