The Optimal Multistage Effort and Contract of VC’s Joint Investment
If the venture project has a great demand of investment, venture entrepreneurs will seek multiple venture capitalists to ensure necessary funding. This paper discusses the decision-making process in the case that multiple venture capitalists invest in a single project. From the beginning of the proj...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Hindawi Limited
2015-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/958212 |
| Summary: | If the venture project has a great demand of investment, venture entrepreneurs will seek multiple venture capitalists to ensure necessary funding. This paper discusses the decision-making process in the case that multiple venture capitalists invest in a single project. From the beginning of the project till the withdrawal of the investment, the efforts of both parties are long term and dynamic. We consider the Stackelberg game model for venture capital investment in multiple periods. Given the optimal efforts by the entrepreneurs, our results clearly show that as time goes, in every single period entrepreneurs will expect their share of revenue paid to shrink. In other words, they expect a higher ex ante payment and a lower ex post payment. But, in contrast, venture capitalists are expecting exactly the opposite. With a further analysis, we also design an optimal contract in multiple periods. Last but not the least, several issues to be further investigated are proposed as well. |
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| ISSN: | 1026-0226 1607-887X |