Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable Functions

The offline dictionary attacks on the database of passwords (PW) or even hashed PW are damaging as a single server break-in leads to many compromised PWs. In this regard, using Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to increase the security of PW manager systems has been recently proposed. Using PUFs...

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Main Authors: Mohammad Mohammadinodoushan, Bertrand Cambou, Christopher Robert Philabaum, Nan Duan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2021-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9330530/
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spelling doaj-c0ca2d23947c4039880a65ffa0b9bfc02021-03-30T15:16:01ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362021-01-019170601707010.1109/ACCESS.2021.30533079330530Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable FunctionsMohammad Mohammadinodoushan0https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1530-4480Bertrand Cambou1Christopher Robert Philabaum2Nan Duan3School of Informatics, Computing and Cyber Systems, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ, USASchool of Informatics, Computing and Cyber Systems, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ, USASchool of Informatics, Computing and Cyber Systems, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ, USASchool of Informatics, Computing and Cyber Systems, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ, USAThe offline dictionary attacks on the database of passwords (PW) or even hashed PW are damaging as a single server break-in leads to many compromised PWs. In this regard, using Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to increase the security of PW manager systems has been recently proposed. Using PUFs allows replacing the hashed PW with PUF responses, which provide an additional hardware layer of security. In this way, even with accessing the database, an adversary should have physical control of the PUF to find the PWs. However, such a scheme cannot operate without a backup in case of catastrophic failure of the PUFs. The likelihood of a failure is low unless the opponent finds a way to destroy the PUF. The scheme used in this article includes a mechanism to make the system works consistently if the PUF fails, with redundant elements. In this method, two PUF outputs are saved in the database to register a user. In authentication, the first PUF output in the database is just checked. The second PUF output in the database is only checked in the exceptional cases when the first PUF does not work correctly; therefore, both false reject rates and latencies are not degraded. A PW manager node is implemented using a low-cost microcontroller, SRAM PUF, and nonvolatile SRAM. The nonvolatile SRAM is embedded in the PWM node circuit as a local database. Statistical tests on the applied commercial SRAM in this article show better PUF quality than those used in previous research. Also, to handle the error in PUF responses, only the stable SRAM cells are used. This article presents the first prototype of a resilient PW manager node with an embedded local database to the best of our knowledge.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9330530/Databasehardware implementationphysical unclonable functionresilient password manager nodeSRAM
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Mohammad Mohammadinodoushan
Bertrand Cambou
Christopher Robert Philabaum
Nan Duan
spellingShingle Mohammad Mohammadinodoushan
Bertrand Cambou
Christopher Robert Philabaum
Nan Duan
Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable Functions
IEEE Access
Database
hardware implementation
physical unclonable function
resilient password manager node
SRAM
author_facet Mohammad Mohammadinodoushan
Bertrand Cambou
Christopher Robert Philabaum
Nan Duan
author_sort Mohammad Mohammadinodoushan
title Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable Functions
title_short Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable Functions
title_full Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable Functions
title_fullStr Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable Functions
title_full_unstemmed Resilient Password Manager Using Physical Unclonable Functions
title_sort resilient password manager using physical unclonable functions
publisher IEEE
series IEEE Access
issn 2169-3536
publishDate 2021-01-01
description The offline dictionary attacks on the database of passwords (PW) or even hashed PW are damaging as a single server break-in leads to many compromised PWs. In this regard, using Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to increase the security of PW manager systems has been recently proposed. Using PUFs allows replacing the hashed PW with PUF responses, which provide an additional hardware layer of security. In this way, even with accessing the database, an adversary should have physical control of the PUF to find the PWs. However, such a scheme cannot operate without a backup in case of catastrophic failure of the PUFs. The likelihood of a failure is low unless the opponent finds a way to destroy the PUF. The scheme used in this article includes a mechanism to make the system works consistently if the PUF fails, with redundant elements. In this method, two PUF outputs are saved in the database to register a user. In authentication, the first PUF output in the database is just checked. The second PUF output in the database is only checked in the exceptional cases when the first PUF does not work correctly; therefore, both false reject rates and latencies are not degraded. A PW manager node is implemented using a low-cost microcontroller, SRAM PUF, and nonvolatile SRAM. The nonvolatile SRAM is embedded in the PWM node circuit as a local database. Statistical tests on the applied commercial SRAM in this article show better PUF quality than those used in previous research. Also, to handle the error in PUF responses, only the stable SRAM cells are used. This article presents the first prototype of a resilient PW manager node with an embedded local database to the best of our knowledge.
topic Database
hardware implementation
physical unclonable function
resilient password manager node
SRAM
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9330530/
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