Singular Causation without Dispositions
Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causat...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2011-01-01
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Series: | THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science |
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Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/928 |
Summary: | Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations. <br /><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: " lang="EN-GB"></span> |
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ISSN: | 0495-4548 2171-679X |