Gramática e Verdade Necessária

• Main Author: João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter
• Format: Article
• Language: Portuguese
• Published: Universidade Federal do Paraná 2009-10-01
• Series: DoisPontos
• Subjects: Russell; Wittgenstein; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; Philosophy of Language; Grammar; Logic; Essence; Representation
• Online Access: http://ojs.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs2/index.php/doispontos/article/view/14932/11395

Wittgenstein objective is to show that Russell’s Theory of Types is condemned to self dissolution. It can only be presented through statements which violate the very rules the theory intends to impinge on the whole of language. On the other hand, if one takes it to be merely a system of rules regarding the usage of signs, it becomes completely arbitrary. The theory of Types presents as an invention something which, from the Tractatus’ point of view, could only be a discovery: the essential structure of reality which is supposed to be presented by language. And then we arrive in the Tractatus at the intermediary solution of an “ineffable essence”. The problem gets evenmore tangled when the Tractatus comes out unworkable and the idea of reality’s essential structure is jeopardized. Towards the end of the paper I try to offer a Wittgenstein type of inquiry on what is left of the concept of necessity once we abandon the idea that reality is endowed with an essential structure which is supposed to be presented by language.