On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders

On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders

The Indian Competition Commission has recently challenged Ericsson's practice of licensing its standards-essential patents (SEPs), relating to cellular standards, for percentage-based royalties based on the selling prices of the end-user licensed products. Ericsson had committed to the relevant...

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Main Authors: David J. Teece, Edward F. Sherry, Peter C. Grindley
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2018-03-01
Series:IIMB Management Review
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0970389617305098
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spelling doaj-bfb37c6e04614e218ae6f19fc96bfe662020-11-24T22:58:35ZengElsevierIIMB Management Review0970-38962018-03-013011026On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent ordersDavid J. Teece0Edward F. Sherry1Peter C. Grindley2Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, Emeryville, CA; Berkeley Research Group, Emeryville, CA; Corresponding author.Expert Research Associates, Emeryville, CABerkeley Research Group, Emeryville, CAThe Indian Competition Commission has recently challenged Ericsson's practice of licensing its standards-essential patents (SEPs), relating to cellular standards, for percentage-based royalties based on the selling prices of the end-user licensed products. Ericsson had committed to the relevant standards-development organisation that it would license its SEPs on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”) terms. The Commission contends that such royalties are “prima facie discriminatory” in violation of the Competition Act, in the (novel) sense that different products selling for different prices pay different per-unit royalties. We analyse the broader implications of the Commission's reasoning, concerned that if adopted, the Commission's reasoning would disrupt common industry licensing practices. Keywords: Patents, Licensing, Discrimination, Telecommunications, FRAND, Standards, Industry practicehttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0970389617305098
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author David J. Teece
Edward F. Sherry
Peter C. Grindley
spellingShingle David J. Teece
Edward F. Sherry
Peter C. Grindley
On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders
IIMB Management Review
author_facet David J. Teece
Edward F. Sherry
Peter C. Grindley
author_sort David J. Teece
title On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders
title_short On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders
title_full On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders
title_fullStr On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders
title_full_unstemmed On the “non-discrimination” aspect of FRAND licensing: A response to the Indian Competition Commission's recent orders
title_sort on the “non-discrimination” aspect of frand licensing: a response to the indian competition commission's recent orders
publisher Elsevier
series IIMB Management Review
issn 0970-3896
publishDate 2018-03-01
description The Indian Competition Commission has recently challenged Ericsson's practice of licensing its standards-essential patents (SEPs), relating to cellular standards, for percentage-based royalties based on the selling prices of the end-user licensed products. Ericsson had committed to the relevant standards-development organisation that it would license its SEPs on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”) terms. The Commission contends that such royalties are “prima facie discriminatory” in violation of the Competition Act, in the (novel) sense that different products selling for different prices pay different per-unit royalties. We analyse the broader implications of the Commission's reasoning, concerned that if adopted, the Commission's reasoning would disrupt common industry licensing practices. Keywords: Patents, Licensing, Discrimination, Telecommunications, FRAND, Standards, Industry practice
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0970389617305098
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AT edwardfsherry onthenondiscriminationaspectoffrandlicensingaresponsetotheindiancompetitioncommissionsrecentorders
AT petercgrindley onthenondiscriminationaspectoffrandlicensingaresponsetotheindiancompetitioncommissionsrecentorders
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