Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach
Disasters accompanied by heavy casualties and huge economic losses directly result in the disruption or delay of economic development. Considering the urgent need for reducing losses and accelerating the process of social recovery, international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) and local NGOs (LN...
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doaj-be3dcab878e449f68e27654e896f3b742020-11-25T02:58:12ZengMDPI AGSustainability2071-10502020-07-01125953595310.3390/su12155953Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game ApproachFan Chen0Sen Liu1Andrea Appolloni2School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, ChinaSchool of Logistics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, ChinaDepartment of Management and Law, Faculty of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata, 00133 Rome, ItalyDisasters accompanied by heavy casualties and huge economic losses directly result in the disruption or delay of economic development. Considering the urgent need for reducing losses and accelerating the process of social recovery, international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) and local NGOs (LNGOs) with different resource endowments should achieve organizational coordination to improve the relief efficiency and sustainability of the humanitarian supply chain. Due to conflicting interests and expectations, this coordination is hard to achieve. In this study, we first establish an evolutionary game model between INGOs and LNGOs to determine the influencing factors and explore the interaction of NGOs in a dynamic way. Our results show that: (1) coordination by resource sharing can improve the sustainability of the humanitarian supply chain; (2) coordination willingness is affected by the behavior of other players, which can nevertheless achieve equilibrium under certain conditions; and (3) the important factors and optimal strategies of players are highlighted in the dynamic model. This study provides several insights into the theory of organizational coordination in the humanitarian supply chain regarding sustainability.https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/15/5953sustainabilityhumanitarian supply chainNGOcoordinationevolutionary game |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Fan Chen Sen Liu Andrea Appolloni |
spellingShingle |
Fan Chen Sen Liu Andrea Appolloni Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach Sustainability sustainability humanitarian supply chain NGO coordination evolutionary game |
author_facet |
Fan Chen Sen Liu Andrea Appolloni |
author_sort |
Fan Chen |
title |
Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
title_short |
Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
title_full |
Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
title_fullStr |
Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
title_sort |
horizontal coordination of i-lngos in the humanitarian supply chain: an evolutionary game approach |
publisher |
MDPI AG |
series |
Sustainability |
issn |
2071-1050 |
publishDate |
2020-07-01 |
description |
Disasters accompanied by heavy casualties and huge economic losses directly result in the disruption or delay of economic development. Considering the urgent need for reducing losses and accelerating the process of social recovery, international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) and local NGOs (LNGOs) with different resource endowments should achieve organizational coordination to improve the relief efficiency and sustainability of the humanitarian supply chain. Due to conflicting interests and expectations, this coordination is hard to achieve. In this study, we first establish an evolutionary game model between INGOs and LNGOs to determine the influencing factors and explore the interaction of NGOs in a dynamic way. Our results show that: (1) coordination by resource sharing can improve the sustainability of the humanitarian supply chain; (2) coordination willingness is affected by the behavior of other players, which can nevertheless achieve equilibrium under certain conditions; and (3) the important factors and optimal strategies of players are highlighted in the dynamic model. This study provides several insights into the theory of organizational coordination in the humanitarian supply chain regarding sustainability. |
topic |
sustainability humanitarian supply chain NGO coordination evolutionary game |
url |
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/15/5953 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT fanchen horizontalcoordinationofilngosinthehumanitariansupplychainanevolutionarygameapproach AT senliu horizontalcoordinationofilngosinthehumanitariansupplychainanevolutionarygameapproach AT andreaappolloni horizontalcoordinationofilngosinthehumanitariansupplychainanevolutionarygameapproach |
_version_ |
1724707877691588608 |