A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience

We present the logical induction criterion for computable algorithms that assign probabilities to every logical statement in a given formal language, and refine those probabilities over time. The criterion is motivated by a series of stock trading analogies. Roughly speaking, each logical sentence p...

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Main Authors: Scott Garrabrant, Tsvi Benson-Tilsen, Andrew Critch, Nate Soares, Jessica Taylor
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Open Publishing Association 2017-07-01
Series:Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Online Access:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08747v1
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spelling doaj-bdf8b0f110e04eeea3c9885377d48d782020-11-25T01:20:22ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802017-07-01251Proc. TARK 201722123510.4204/EPTCS.251.16:37A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-OmniscienceScott Garrabrant0Tsvi Benson-Tilsen1Andrew Critch2Nate Soares3Jessica Taylor4 Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Berkeley, CA Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Berkeley, CA Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Berkeley, CA Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Berkeley, CA Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Berkeley, CA We present the logical induction criterion for computable algorithms that assign probabilities to every logical statement in a given formal language, and refine those probabilities over time. The criterion is motivated by a series of stock trading analogies. Roughly speaking, each logical sentence phi is associated with a stock that is worth $1 per share if phi is true and nothing otherwise, and we interpret the belief-state of a logically uncertain reasoner as a set of market prices, where pt_N(phi)=50% means that on day N, shares of phi may be bought or sold from the reasoner for 50%. A market is then called a logical inductor if (very roughly) there is no polynomial-time computable trading strategy with finite risk tolerance that earns unbounded profits in that market over time. We then describe how this single criterion implies a number of desirable properties of bounded reasoners; for example, logical inductors outpace their underlying deductive process, perform universal empirical induction given enough time to think, and place strong trust in their own reasoning process.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08747v1
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Scott Garrabrant
Tsvi Benson-Tilsen
Andrew Critch
Nate Soares
Jessica Taylor
spellingShingle Scott Garrabrant
Tsvi Benson-Tilsen
Andrew Critch
Nate Soares
Jessica Taylor
A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
author_facet Scott Garrabrant
Tsvi Benson-Tilsen
Andrew Critch
Nate Soares
Jessica Taylor
author_sort Scott Garrabrant
title A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience
title_short A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience
title_full A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience
title_fullStr A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience
title_full_unstemmed A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience
title_sort formal approach to the problem of logical non-omniscience
publisher Open Publishing Association
series Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
issn 2075-2180
publishDate 2017-07-01
description We present the logical induction criterion for computable algorithms that assign probabilities to every logical statement in a given formal language, and refine those probabilities over time. The criterion is motivated by a series of stock trading analogies. Roughly speaking, each logical sentence phi is associated with a stock that is worth $1 per share if phi is true and nothing otherwise, and we interpret the belief-state of a logically uncertain reasoner as a set of market prices, where pt_N(phi)=50% means that on day N, shares of phi may be bought or sold from the reasoner for 50%. A market is then called a logical inductor if (very roughly) there is no polynomial-time computable trading strategy with finite risk tolerance that earns unbounded profits in that market over time. We then describe how this single criterion implies a number of desirable properties of bounded reasoners; for example, logical inductors outpace their underlying deductive process, perform universal empirical induction given enough time to think, and place strong trust in their own reasoning process.
url http://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08747v1
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