Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality?
In this study, I juxtapose the views of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Menachem Fisch on radical changes of mind. I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to ra...
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| Format: | Article |
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De Gruyter
2020-09-01
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| Series: | Open Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0126 |
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doaj-b9f79e76c9f84f1a96f6944c530aecb72021-09-22T06:13:18ZengDe GruyterOpen Philosophy2543-88752020-09-013157858510.1515/opphil-2020-0126opphil-2020-0126Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality?Ben-Menahem Yemima0Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, IsraelIn this study, I juxtapose the views of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Menachem Fisch on radical changes of mind. I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to rationality are critically examined. Hili Razinsky’s analysis of ambivalence is shown to contribute to the understanding of change by providing a broader perspective on the rationality of belief. Her work thus provides a promising alternative to the above positions and the impasse they confront.https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0126rationalitychange of mindambivalencebig decisionstheory change |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Ben-Menahem Yemima |
| spellingShingle |
Ben-Menahem Yemima Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality? Open Philosophy rationality change of mind ambivalence big decisions theory change |
| author_facet |
Ben-Menahem Yemima |
| author_sort |
Ben-Menahem Yemima |
| title |
Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality? |
| title_short |
Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality? |
| title_full |
Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality? |
| title_fullStr |
Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality? |
| title_sort |
changing one’s mind: the limits of rationality? |
| publisher |
De Gruyter |
| series |
Open Philosophy |
| issn |
2543-8875 |
| publishDate |
2020-09-01 |
| description |
In this study, I juxtapose the views of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Menachem Fisch on radical changes of mind. I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to rationality are critically examined. Hili Razinsky’s analysis of ambivalence is shown to contribute to the understanding of change by providing a broader perspective on the rationality of belief. Her work thus provides a promising alternative to the above positions and the impasse they confront. |
| topic |
rationality change of mind ambivalence big decisions theory change |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0126 |
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AT benmenahemyemima changingonesmindthelimitsofrationality |
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