Changing one’s mind: The limits of rationality?
In this study, I juxtapose the views of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Menachem Fisch on radical changes of mind. I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to ra...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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De Gruyter
2020-09-01
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| Series: | Open Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0126 |
| Summary: | In this study, I juxtapose the views of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Menachem Fisch on radical changes of mind. I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to rationality are critically examined. Hili Razinsky’s analysis of ambivalence is shown to contribute to the understanding of change by providing a broader perspective on the rationality of belief. Her work thus provides a promising alternative to the above positions and the impasse they confront. |
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| ISSN: | 2543-8875 |