Experiments as Instruments: Heterogeneous Position Effects in Sponsored Search Auctions
Google and Bing employ a generalized second price (GSP) auction to allocate billions of dollars of sponsored search advertising. Despite evolving from a naive, first-price, rank-by-bid auction, the GSP has been shown to achieve an efficient allocation and favorable revenue properties via a tight the...
Main Authors: | Matthew Goldman, Justin Rao |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
European Alliance for Innovation (EAI)
2016-12-01
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Series: | EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://eudl.eu/doi/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2261043 |
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