Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging Goal
The imbalance of the currents leaked by CMOS standard cells when different logic values are applied to their inputs can be exploited as a side channel to recover the secrets of cryptographic implementations. Traditional side-channel countermeasures, primarily designed to thwart the dynamic leakage b...
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doaj-b578c282e4c440d2b226df474c9b712d2021-08-06T15:19:53ZengMDPI AGApplied Sciences2076-34172021-08-01117143714310.3390/app11157143Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging GoalBijan Fadaeinia0Thorben Moos1Amir Moradi2Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr University Bochum, 44801 Bochum, GermanyHorst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr University Bochum, 44801 Bochum, GermanyHorst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr University Bochum, 44801 Bochum, GermanyThe imbalance of the currents leaked by CMOS standard cells when different logic values are applied to their inputs can be exploited as a side channel to recover the secrets of cryptographic implementations. Traditional side-channel countermeasures, primarily designed to thwart the dynamic leakage behavior, were shown to be much less powerful against this static threat. Thus, a special protection mechanism called Balanced Static Power Logic (BSPL) has been proposed very recently. Essentially, fundamental standard cells are re-designed to balance their drain-source leakage current independent of the given input. In this work, we analyze the BSPL concept in more detail and reveal several design issues that limit its effectiveness as a universal logic library. Although balancing drain-source currents remains a valid approach even in more advanced technology generations, we show that it is conceptually insufficient to achieve a fully data-independent leakage behavior in smaller geometries. Instead, we suggest an alternative approach, so-called improved BSPL (iBSPL). To evaluate the proposed method, we use information theoretic analysis. As an attack strategy, we have chosen Moments-Correlating DPA (MCDPA), since this analysis technique does not depend on a particular leakage model and allows a fair comparison. Through these evaluation methods, we show iBSPL demands fewer resources and delivers better balance in the ideal case as well as in the presence of process variations.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/15/7143side-channel analysisstatic power consumptioncurrent leakagehiding |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Bijan Fadaeinia Thorben Moos Amir Moradi |
spellingShingle |
Bijan Fadaeinia Thorben Moos Amir Moradi Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging Goal Applied Sciences side-channel analysis static power consumption current leakage hiding |
author_facet |
Bijan Fadaeinia Thorben Moos Amir Moradi |
author_sort |
Bijan Fadaeinia |
title |
Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging Goal |
title_short |
Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging Goal |
title_full |
Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging Goal |
title_fullStr |
Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging Goal |
title_full_unstemmed |
Balancing the Leakage Currents in Nanometer CMOS Logic—A Challenging Goal |
title_sort |
balancing the leakage currents in nanometer cmos logic—a challenging goal |
publisher |
MDPI AG |
series |
Applied Sciences |
issn |
2076-3417 |
publishDate |
2021-08-01 |
description |
The imbalance of the currents leaked by CMOS standard cells when different logic values are applied to their inputs can be exploited as a side channel to recover the secrets of cryptographic implementations. Traditional side-channel countermeasures, primarily designed to thwart the dynamic leakage behavior, were shown to be much less powerful against this static threat. Thus, a special protection mechanism called Balanced Static Power Logic (BSPL) has been proposed very recently. Essentially, fundamental standard cells are re-designed to balance their drain-source leakage current independent of the given input. In this work, we analyze the BSPL concept in more detail and reveal several design issues that limit its effectiveness as a universal logic library. Although balancing drain-source currents remains a valid approach even in more advanced technology generations, we show that it is conceptually insufficient to achieve a fully data-independent leakage behavior in smaller geometries. Instead, we suggest an alternative approach, so-called improved BSPL (iBSPL). To evaluate the proposed method, we use information theoretic analysis. As an attack strategy, we have chosen Moments-Correlating DPA (MCDPA), since this analysis technique does not depend on a particular leakage model and allows a fair comparison. Through these evaluation methods, we show iBSPL demands fewer resources and delivers better balance in the ideal case as well as in the presence of process variations. |
topic |
side-channel analysis static power consumption current leakage hiding |
url |
https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/15/7143 |
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