A Regress of Justification? Brandom and Wittgenstein on Certainty and Reasonable Doubt
In order to ward off the global threat of a regress of justification, Brandom argues that some claims in our linguistic practices must be treated as “innocent until proven guilty”, i.e. participants must be treated as prima facie entitled when making them. Examples he gives include claims such as “...
Main Author: | Sybren Heyndels |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Disputatio Editions-IAR
2019-06-01
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Series: | Disputatio |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://studiahumanitatis.eu/ojs/index.php/disputatio/article/view/149 |
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