Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?

To further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the R...

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Main Author: Xing Xin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-04-01
Series:Symmetry
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/12/4/670
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spelling doaj-b5127b09896541d4b57f1a20cda4f8e12020-11-25T02:03:40ZengMDPI AGSymmetry2073-89942020-04-011267067010.3390/sym12040670Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?Xing Xin0School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, ChinaTo further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Draft)” to propose the implementation of power sales side Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which cannot be realized without an effective government regulation mechanism. However, information asymmetry and the limited rationality of the regulatory agencies and private power sales companies in the regulation process make the regulatory effect uncertain to the detriment of a sustainable regulation of the power industry. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the regulation mechanism of the RPS policy in China. We considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies, and established an evolutionary game model based on a limited rationality. We also analyzed the implementation effects of the static reward penalty mechanism and dynamic reward penalty mechanism, respectively. The system dynamics (SD) simulation results showed that under the static reward penalty mechanism, there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, and there will be volatility that exists in the evolution process. However, the dynamic reward penalty mechanism can effectively solve these problems. What is more, our results implied that governments should formulate appropriate RPS quotas, improve the green certificate trading mechanism, and take into account the market size of power sales while implementing RPS policy.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/12/4/670renewable portfolio standards (RPS)power sales marketevolutionary gamereward–penalty mechanismsystem dynamics (SD)
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Xing Xin
spellingShingle Xing Xin
Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?
Symmetry
renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
power sales market
evolutionary game
reward–penalty mechanism
system dynamics (SD)
author_facet Xing Xin
author_sort Xing Xin
title Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?
title_short Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?
title_full Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?
title_fullStr Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?
title_full_unstemmed Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?
title_sort can a dynamic reward–penalty mechanism help the implementation of renewable portfolio standards under information asymmetry?
publisher MDPI AG
series Symmetry
issn 2073-8994
publishDate 2020-04-01
description To further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Draft)” to propose the implementation of power sales side Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which cannot be realized without an effective government regulation mechanism. However, information asymmetry and the limited rationality of the regulatory agencies and private power sales companies in the regulation process make the regulatory effect uncertain to the detriment of a sustainable regulation of the power industry. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the regulation mechanism of the RPS policy in China. We considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies, and established an evolutionary game model based on a limited rationality. We also analyzed the implementation effects of the static reward penalty mechanism and dynamic reward penalty mechanism, respectively. The system dynamics (SD) simulation results showed that under the static reward penalty mechanism, there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, and there will be volatility that exists in the evolution process. However, the dynamic reward penalty mechanism can effectively solve these problems. What is more, our results implied that governments should formulate appropriate RPS quotas, improve the green certificate trading mechanism, and take into account the market size of power sales while implementing RPS policy.
topic renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
power sales market
evolutionary game
reward–penalty mechanism
system dynamics (SD)
url https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/12/4/670
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