Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process

Among different types of network, Tor network is mostly referred as an onion-routing network which enables the anonymous communication and supports TCP applications over the network. The onion-routing is utilized by the Tor network for transmitting the information of users via virtual circuits which...

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Main Authors: K. Sangeetha, K. Ravikumar
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2018-11-01
Series:Egyptian Informatics Journal
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110866517301457
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spelling doaj-b4fcb81c3ba94f9eb5eddeb5456a26db2021-07-02T06:46:50ZengElsevierEgyptian Informatics Journal1110-86652018-11-01193199205Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing ProcessK. Sangeetha0K. Ravikumar1Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore, India; Corresponding author at: 440/2, Murugalayam, Water Board Colony, Kattur, Alagapuram, Salem 636016, India.Faculty of Computer Science Department, Tamil University, IndiaAmong different types of network, Tor network is mostly referred as an onion-routing network which enables the anonymous communication and supports TCP applications over the network. The onion-routing is utilized by the Tor network for transmitting the information of users via virtual circuits which are created by several successive relays. The performance and security of the anonymous communication in Tor network have been improved by using Novel Traffic Dividing and Scheduling (NTDS) mechanism. Normally, this mechanism was used for preventing the basic versions of sniper attacks in the Tor network. On the other hand, protocol-level attacks were not possible to prevent since some malicious entry router may duplicate, alter, insert or delete the TCP stream cells from the sender. This may cause cell recognition errors at the exit router and these cell recognition errors were recognized at the destination which helps to identify the sender. Hence, in this article, a defense mechanism called Mid-DRRQ is proposed for protocol-level attacks against Tor network. In Mid-DRRQ mechanism, the protocol-level attacks are prevented by using indistinguishability obfuscation model which generates the fake traffic within the middle relay. This fake traffic is allowed on outgoing connections without any cover traffic. Moreover, the outgoing connections of middle relays are controlled by using Deficit Round Robin queuing process. Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed mechanism effectively prevents the protocol-level attacks against Tor network. Keywords: Tor network, Novel traffic dividing and scheduling, Protocol-level attacks, Indistinguishability obfuscation, Fake traffic, Deficit Round Robin queuinghttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110866517301457
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author K. Sangeetha
K. Ravikumar
spellingShingle K. Sangeetha
K. Ravikumar
Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process
Egyptian Informatics Journal
author_facet K. Sangeetha
K. Ravikumar
author_sort K. Sangeetha
title Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process
title_short Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process
title_full Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process
title_fullStr Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process
title_full_unstemmed Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process
title_sort defense against protocol level attack in tor network using deficit round robin queuing process
publisher Elsevier
series Egyptian Informatics Journal
issn 1110-8665
publishDate 2018-11-01
description Among different types of network, Tor network is mostly referred as an onion-routing network which enables the anonymous communication and supports TCP applications over the network. The onion-routing is utilized by the Tor network for transmitting the information of users via virtual circuits which are created by several successive relays. The performance and security of the anonymous communication in Tor network have been improved by using Novel Traffic Dividing and Scheduling (NTDS) mechanism. Normally, this mechanism was used for preventing the basic versions of sniper attacks in the Tor network. On the other hand, protocol-level attacks were not possible to prevent since some malicious entry router may duplicate, alter, insert or delete the TCP stream cells from the sender. This may cause cell recognition errors at the exit router and these cell recognition errors were recognized at the destination which helps to identify the sender. Hence, in this article, a defense mechanism called Mid-DRRQ is proposed for protocol-level attacks against Tor network. In Mid-DRRQ mechanism, the protocol-level attacks are prevented by using indistinguishability obfuscation model which generates the fake traffic within the middle relay. This fake traffic is allowed on outgoing connections without any cover traffic. Moreover, the outgoing connections of middle relays are controlled by using Deficit Round Robin queuing process. Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed mechanism effectively prevents the protocol-level attacks against Tor network. Keywords: Tor network, Novel traffic dividing and scheduling, Protocol-level attacks, Indistinguishability obfuscation, Fake traffic, Deficit Round Robin queuing
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110866517301457
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