Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models
Public good games are a metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in groups in the presence of incentives to free ride. In the model presented here agents play a public good game with their neighbors in a social network structure. Agents' decision rules in our model are inspired by elementary...
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doaj-b4512954283646da846b4b07aa99ccb32020-11-25T02:41:16ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Physics2296-424X2020-03-01810.3389/fphy.2020.00058515259Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network ModelsMarco Tomassini0Alberto Antonioni1Department of Information Systems, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, SwitzerlandComplex Systems Interdisciplinary Group (GISC), Department of Mathematics, Carlos III University of Madrid, Getafe, SpainPublic good games are a metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in groups in the presence of incentives to free ride. In the model presented here agents play a public good game with their neighbors in a social network structure. Agents' decision rules in our model are inspired by elementary learning observed in laboratory and online behavioral experiments involving human participants with the same amount of information, i.e., when individuals only know their own current contribution and their own cumulated payoff. In addition, agents in the model are allowed to severe links with groups in which their payoff is lower and create links to a new randomly chosen group. Reinforcing the results obtained in network scenarios where agents play Prisoner's Dilemma games, we show that thanks to this relinking possibility, the whole system reaches higher levels of average contribution with respect to the case in which the network cannot change. Our setup opens new frameworks to be investigated, and potentially confirmed, through controlled human experiments.https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fphy.2020.00058/fullcooperationPGGdynamic networkssocial networkssimulation model |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Marco Tomassini Alberto Antonioni |
spellingShingle |
Marco Tomassini Alberto Antonioni Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models Frontiers in Physics cooperation PGG dynamic networks social networks simulation model |
author_facet |
Marco Tomassini Alberto Antonioni |
author_sort |
Marco Tomassini |
title |
Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models |
title_short |
Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models |
title_full |
Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models |
title_fullStr |
Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models |
title_full_unstemmed |
Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models |
title_sort |
public goods games on coevolving social network models |
publisher |
Frontiers Media S.A. |
series |
Frontiers in Physics |
issn |
2296-424X |
publishDate |
2020-03-01 |
description |
Public good games are a metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in groups in the presence of incentives to free ride. In the model presented here agents play a public good game with their neighbors in a social network structure. Agents' decision rules in our model are inspired by elementary learning observed in laboratory and online behavioral experiments involving human participants with the same amount of information, i.e., when individuals only know their own current contribution and their own cumulated payoff. In addition, agents in the model are allowed to severe links with groups in which their payoff is lower and create links to a new randomly chosen group. Reinforcing the results obtained in network scenarios where agents play Prisoner's Dilemma games, we show that thanks to this relinking possibility, the whole system reaches higher levels of average contribution with respect to the case in which the network cannot change. Our setup opens new frameworks to be investigated, and potentially confirmed, through controlled human experiments. |
topic |
cooperation PGG dynamic networks social networks simulation model |
url |
https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fphy.2020.00058/full |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT marcotomassini publicgoodsgamesoncoevolvingsocialnetworkmodels AT albertoantonioni publicgoodsgamesoncoevolvingsocialnetworkmodels |
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1724779331943661568 |