Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China
This paper examines the motivation of dividend payout policies for Chinese listed firms before and after the Split Share Structure Reform in China from the corporate governance-related viewpoint. Analysis was carried out using panel data with random effect from a sample of firms listed on the A-shar...
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2021-01-01
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Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1923620 |
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doaj-b28854e4cc614196851839944ec593662021-06-02T10:12:14ZengTaylor & Francis GroupCogent Economics & Finance2332-20392021-01-019110.1080/23322039.2021.19236201923620Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in ChinaYufan Zhao0Sin Huei Ng1Xiamen UniversityXiamen University MalaysiaThis paper examines the motivation of dividend payout policies for Chinese listed firms before and after the Split Share Structure Reform in China from the corporate governance-related viewpoint. Analysis was carried out using panel data with random effect from a sample of firms listed on the A-share Chinese market in the period of 2001–2004 (before the reform) and 2014–2017 (after the reform). It is found that (1) the incentive of tunnelling via dividend by controlling shareholders is weaken after the reform; (2) dividends are taken as a measure to reduce agency problems caused by free cash flows after the reform; (3) dividends after the reform become more stable than those before the reform. (4) in general, the market reacts positively to the increase of dividend both before and after the reform. It can be concluded that dividend policies are taken as the measure of minority shareholder protection and signalling rather than expropriation after the reform. This paper contributes to the literature by comparing dividend payout policies during the full circulation era with that before the reform was initiated.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1923620dividend policysplit share structure reformtunnellingfree cash flowexpropriationstock market reaction |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Yufan Zhao Sin Huei Ng |
spellingShingle |
Yufan Zhao Sin Huei Ng Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China Cogent Economics & Finance dividend policy split share structure reform tunnelling free cash flow expropriation stock market reaction |
author_facet |
Yufan Zhao Sin Huei Ng |
author_sort |
Yufan Zhao |
title |
Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China |
title_short |
Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China |
title_full |
Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China |
title_fullStr |
Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China |
title_full_unstemmed |
Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China |
title_sort |
dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in china |
publisher |
Taylor & Francis Group |
series |
Cogent Economics & Finance |
issn |
2332-2039 |
publishDate |
2021-01-01 |
description |
This paper examines the motivation of dividend payout policies for Chinese listed firms before and after the Split Share Structure Reform in China from the corporate governance-related viewpoint. Analysis was carried out using panel data with random effect from a sample of firms listed on the A-share Chinese market in the period of 2001–2004 (before the reform) and 2014–2017 (after the reform). It is found that (1) the incentive of tunnelling via dividend by controlling shareholders is weaken after the reform; (2) dividends are taken as a measure to reduce agency problems caused by free cash flows after the reform; (3) dividends after the reform become more stable than those before the reform. (4) in general, the market reacts positively to the increase of dividend both before and after the reform. It can be concluded that dividend policies are taken as the measure of minority shareholder protection and signalling rather than expropriation after the reform. This paper contributes to the literature by comparing dividend payout policies during the full circulation era with that before the reform was initiated. |
topic |
dividend policy split share structure reform tunnelling free cash flow expropriation stock market reaction |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1923620 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT yufanzhao dividendpayoutpoliciesinthepreandpostsplitsharestructurereforminchina AT sinhueing dividendpayoutpoliciesinthepreandpostsplitsharestructurereforminchina |
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1721405220924162048 |