Operational Risks in QRAs

Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) are instrumental in critical safety decisions such as licensing operations, siting equipment and occupied buildings and periodically investing in safeguarding as part of continuous risk-reduction programmes. QRAs are mostly based on process information such as Pi...

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Main Authors: Angel Casal, Hakon Olsen
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: AIDIC Servizi S.r.l. 2016-04-01
Series:Chemical Engineering Transactions
Online Access:https://www.cetjournal.it/index.php/cet/article/view/3384
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spelling doaj-b1b12170480943f1863e408669795ce42021-02-20T20:59:06ZengAIDIC Servizi S.r.l.Chemical Engineering Transactions2283-92162016-04-014810.3303/CET1648099Operational Risks in QRAsAngel CasalHakon OlsenQuantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) are instrumental in critical safety decisions such as licensing operations, siting equipment and occupied buildings and periodically investing in safeguarding as part of continuous risk-reduction programmes. QRAs are mostly based on process information such as Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Heat and Material Balances (H&MBs). This basic information is sufficient to identify inventories of hazardous substances within isolatable pressure-containing segments, and the number and type of mechanical component within the segments to estimate the likelihood of releases. However, recent history is showing several accidents where mechanical components such as those identified in standard QRAs did not fail, prior to the release. We call these accidents operational accidents. Operational accidents are rarely found in current QRAs. Consequently, this raises the question of whether operational risks are adequately covered in QRAs to ensure the calculated risk pictures are realistic and valid for the above mentioned critical decisions. This paper looks at some of these accidents to illustrate operational risks and discusses some of the uncertainties present in current QRAs such those associated with failure rates provided in widely-accepted databases. The paper proposes a methodology for including operational risks in QRAs systematically using existing Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) techniques such as HAZID, HAZOP, Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).https://www.cetjournal.it/index.php/cet/article/view/3384
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Angel Casal
Hakon Olsen
spellingShingle Angel Casal
Hakon Olsen
Operational Risks in QRAs
Chemical Engineering Transactions
author_facet Angel Casal
Hakon Olsen
author_sort Angel Casal
title Operational Risks in QRAs
title_short Operational Risks in QRAs
title_full Operational Risks in QRAs
title_fullStr Operational Risks in QRAs
title_full_unstemmed Operational Risks in QRAs
title_sort operational risks in qras
publisher AIDIC Servizi S.r.l.
series Chemical Engineering Transactions
issn 2283-9216
publishDate 2016-04-01
description Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) are instrumental in critical safety decisions such as licensing operations, siting equipment and occupied buildings and periodically investing in safeguarding as part of continuous risk-reduction programmes. QRAs are mostly based on process information such as Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Heat and Material Balances (H&MBs). This basic information is sufficient to identify inventories of hazardous substances within isolatable pressure-containing segments, and the number and type of mechanical component within the segments to estimate the likelihood of releases. However, recent history is showing several accidents where mechanical components such as those identified in standard QRAs did not fail, prior to the release. We call these accidents operational accidents. Operational accidents are rarely found in current QRAs. Consequently, this raises the question of whether operational risks are adequately covered in QRAs to ensure the calculated risk pictures are realistic and valid for the above mentioned critical decisions. This paper looks at some of these accidents to illustrate operational risks and discusses some of the uncertainties present in current QRAs such those associated with failure rates provided in widely-accepted databases. The paper proposes a methodology for including operational risks in QRAs systematically using existing Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) techniques such as HAZID, HAZOP, Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
url https://www.cetjournal.it/index.php/cet/article/view/3384
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