Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
Do mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characte...
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Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0016/943 |
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doaj-b0f4259715bc4093a9282874e48b6fe32020-11-25T02:07:48ZdeuMimesis Edizioni, MilanoRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia2039-46672239-26292019-08-0110219020710.4453/rifp.2019.0016Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativaEmanuela CampisiMarco MazzoneDo mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characterised by their strong relationship to sensory-motor representations. For this reason, our argument takes two directions. First, we show that representational gestures can form part of a speaker’s communicative intention as, for example, when the speaker overtly makes them salient. However, it is important to point out that being part of a communicative intention is not equivalent to being consciously planned. Secondly, we will argue that the meaning carried by gestures is actually imagistic, and not propositional. To this end, we provide a detailed discussion of two arguments favouring the propositional hypothesis: that images cannot be part of the speaker’s communicative intention because their content is not truth-conditional and because they do not allow us to make inferences. We will show that both these arguments are debatable.https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0016/943Communicative IntentionsRepresentational GesturesImagerySpeaker's Meaning |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
deu |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Emanuela Campisi Marco Mazzone |
spellingShingle |
Emanuela Campisi Marco Mazzone Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia Communicative Intentions Representational Gestures Imagery Speaker's Meaning |
author_facet |
Emanuela Campisi Marco Mazzone |
author_sort |
Emanuela Campisi |
title |
Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa |
title_short |
Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa |
title_full |
Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa |
title_fullStr |
Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa |
title_full_unstemmed |
Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa |
title_sort |
gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa |
publisher |
Mimesis Edizioni, Milano |
series |
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
issn |
2039-4667 2239-2629 |
publishDate |
2019-08-01 |
description |
Do mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characterised by their strong relationship to sensory-motor representations. For this reason, our argument takes two directions. First, we show that representational gestures can form part of a speaker’s communicative intention as, for example, when the speaker overtly makes them salient. However, it is important to point out that being part of a communicative intention is not equivalent to being consciously planned. Secondly, we will argue that the meaning carried by gestures is actually imagistic, and not propositional. To this end, we provide a detailed discussion of two arguments favouring the propositional hypothesis: that images cannot be part of the speaker’s communicative intention because their content is not truth-conditional and because they do not allow us to make inferences. We will show that both these arguments are debatable. |
topic |
Communicative Intentions Representational Gestures Imagery Speaker's Meaning |
url |
https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0016/943 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT emanuelacampisi gesticoverbalieimmaginimentaliiconfinidellintenzionecomunicativa AT marcomazzone gesticoverbalieimmaginimentaliiconfinidellintenzionecomunicativa |
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1724929636106764288 |