Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa

Do mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characte...

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Main Authors: Emanuela Campisi, Marco Mazzone
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Mimesis Edizioni, Milano 2019-08-01
Series:Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0016/943
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spelling doaj-b0f4259715bc4093a9282874e48b6fe32020-11-25T02:07:48ZdeuMimesis Edizioni, MilanoRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia2039-46672239-26292019-08-0110219020710.4453/rifp.2019.0016Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativaEmanuela CampisiMarco MazzoneDo mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characterised by their strong relationship to sensory-motor representations. For this reason, our argument takes two directions. First, we show that representational gestures can form part of a speaker’s communicative intention as, for example, when the speaker overtly makes them salient. However, it is important to point out that being part of a communicative intention is not equivalent to being consciously planned. Secondly, we will argue that the meaning carried by gestures is actually imagistic, and not propositional. To this end, we provide a detailed discussion of two arguments favouring the propositional hypothesis: that images cannot be part of the speaker’s communicative intention because their content is not truth-conditional and because they do not allow us to make inferences. We will show that both these arguments are debatable.https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0016/943Communicative IntentionsRepresentational GesturesImagerySpeaker's Meaning
collection DOAJ
language deu
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Emanuela Campisi
Marco Mazzone
spellingShingle Emanuela Campisi
Marco Mazzone
Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Communicative Intentions
Representational Gestures
Imagery
Speaker's Meaning
author_facet Emanuela Campisi
Marco Mazzone
author_sort Emanuela Campisi
title Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
title_short Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
title_full Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
title_fullStr Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
title_full_unstemmed Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
title_sort gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
publisher Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
series Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
issn 2039-4667
2239-2629
publishDate 2019-08-01
description Do mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characterised by their strong relationship to sensory-motor representations. For this reason, our argument takes two directions. First, we show that representational gestures can form part of a speaker’s communicative intention as, for example, when the speaker overtly makes them salient. However, it is important to point out that being part of a communicative intention is not equivalent to being consciously planned. Secondly, we will argue that the meaning carried by gestures is actually imagistic, and not propositional. To this end, we provide a detailed discussion of two arguments favouring the propositional hypothesis: that images cannot be part of the speaker’s communicative intention because their content is not truth-conditional and because they do not allow us to make inferences. We will show that both these arguments are debatable.
topic Communicative Intentions
Representational Gestures
Imagery
Speaker's Meaning
url https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0016/943
work_keys_str_mv AT emanuelacampisi gesticoverbalieimmaginimentaliiconfinidellintenzionecomunicativa
AT marcomazzone gesticoverbalieimmaginimentaliiconfinidellintenzionecomunicativa
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