Gesti co-verbali e immagini mentali: i confini dell’intenzione comunicativa
Do mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characte...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
2019-08-01
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| Series: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0016/943 |
| Summary: | Do mental images form part of a speaker’s communicative intention? This and similar questions have usually been addressed within the framework of embodied cognition. Here, instead, we want to address the question from a different point of view, examining representational gestures, which are characterised by their strong relationship to sensory-motor representations. For this reason, our argument takes two directions. First, we show that representational gestures can form part of a speaker’s communicative intention as, for example, when the speaker overtly makes them salient. However, it is important to point out that being part of a communicative intention is not equivalent to being consciously planned. Secondly, we will argue that the meaning carried by gestures is actually imagistic, and not propositional. To this end, we provide a detailed discussion of two arguments favouring the propositional hypothesis: that images cannot be part of the speaker’s communicative intention because their content is not truth-conditional and because they do not allow us to make inferences. We will show that both these arguments are debatable. |
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| ISSN: | 2039-4667 2239-2629 |