From political self-deception to self-deception in political theory

In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti carves out valuable space for the analysis of behaviour on the part of political leaders that lies between straightforward deception and honest mistakes. In these comments I consider whether the concept of self-deception can travel from the political to the acad...

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Main Author: Alice Baderin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Taylor & Francis Group 2020-12-01
Series:Ethics & Global Politics
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1837483
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spelling doaj-b00ab357c051454ebc0c503cda692a0d2020-12-17T12:50:44ZengTaylor & Francis GroupEthics & Global Politics1654-49511654-63692020-12-01134263710.1080/16544951.2020.18374831837483From political self-deception to self-deception in political theoryAlice Baderin0University of ReadingIn Political Self-Deception, Galeotti carves out valuable space for the analysis of behaviour on the part of political leaders that lies between straightforward deception and honest mistakes. In these comments I consider whether the concept of self-deception can travel from the political to the academic arena, to illuminate problems in how political theorists treat empirical data in the course of their normative work. Drawing on examples from the literature on the social bases of self-respect, I show that political theorists too are vulnerable to the motivationally biased treatment of data. I suggest that this problem can helpfully be located on the same broad terrain Galeotti outlines, between lying and mistakes. I also identify some potential analogues, for the academic sphere, of Galeotti's proposed remedies for political SD. The paper goes on to reflect on how Galeotti herself employs empirical evidence in developing her account of self-deception. In particular, I challenge the empirical basis of her assumption that political self-deception is significantly more predictable, and therefore preventable, than political lying. My discussion seeks to show that, in addition to its intended contribution to the study of political deception, Political Self-Deception offers a valuable perspective on recent debates about the place of empirical evidence in political theory. However, approaching the book from this methodological angle reveals, in turn, some weaknesses in the empirical foundations of one of Galeotti's own key normative claims.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1837483political self-deceptionpolitical theoryempirical evidencemethods
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Alice Baderin
spellingShingle Alice Baderin
From political self-deception to self-deception in political theory
Ethics & Global Politics
political self-deception
political theory
empirical evidence
methods
author_facet Alice Baderin
author_sort Alice Baderin
title From political self-deception to self-deception in political theory
title_short From political self-deception to self-deception in political theory
title_full From political self-deception to self-deception in political theory
title_fullStr From political self-deception to self-deception in political theory
title_full_unstemmed From political self-deception to self-deception in political theory
title_sort from political self-deception to self-deception in political theory
publisher Taylor & Francis Group
series Ethics & Global Politics
issn 1654-4951
1654-6369
publishDate 2020-12-01
description In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti carves out valuable space for the analysis of behaviour on the part of political leaders that lies between straightforward deception and honest mistakes. In these comments I consider whether the concept of self-deception can travel from the political to the academic arena, to illuminate problems in how political theorists treat empirical data in the course of their normative work. Drawing on examples from the literature on the social bases of self-respect, I show that political theorists too are vulnerable to the motivationally biased treatment of data. I suggest that this problem can helpfully be located on the same broad terrain Galeotti outlines, between lying and mistakes. I also identify some potential analogues, for the academic sphere, of Galeotti's proposed remedies for political SD. The paper goes on to reflect on how Galeotti herself employs empirical evidence in developing her account of self-deception. In particular, I challenge the empirical basis of her assumption that political self-deception is significantly more predictable, and therefore preventable, than political lying. My discussion seeks to show that, in addition to its intended contribution to the study of political deception, Political Self-Deception offers a valuable perspective on recent debates about the place of empirical evidence in political theory. However, approaching the book from this methodological angle reveals, in turn, some weaknesses in the empirical foundations of one of Galeotti's own key normative claims.
topic political self-deception
political theory
empirical evidence
methods
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1837483
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