A theory of sequential group reciprocity
Abstract Games that appear to be independent, involving none of the same players, may be related by emotions of reciprocity between the members of the same groups. In the real world, individuals are members of groups and want to reward or punish those groups whose members have been kind or unkind to...
Main Authors: | Alejandro T. Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro Mosiño |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
2017-08-01
|
Series: | Latin American Economic Review |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40503-017-0043-8 |
Similar Items
-
Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity
by: Doruk İriş, et al.
Published: (2013-02-01) -
An Investigation of Behavioral Influences in Strategic Decision Making
by: Cardella, Eric
Published: (2012) -
The Ultimatum Game: An Introduction to Quantitative Literacy in a Social Justice Context
by: Robert Root
Published: (2019-07-01) -
Dynamic pricing with fairness concerns and a capacity constraint
by: Selove, M.
Published: (2019) -
A group from Hackenbush game
by: Awad Alabdala, et al.
Published: (2019-06-01)