Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the State

Administrative and tax regimes Free ‘Port of Vladivostok (SPV)’ and ‘Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development (TOR)’ have become a key mechanism for reconciling the interests of the state and investors within the state policy to stimulate the economic development of the Russian Far Ea...

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Main Author: Maksim Evseevich Krivelevich
Format: Article
Language:Russian
Published: Economic Research Institute of the Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 2021-07-01
Series:Prostranstvennaâ Èkonomika
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.spatial-economics.com/images/spatial-econimics/2021_2/SE.2021.2.016-033.Krivelevich.pdf
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spelling doaj-afd0644011254b7c90bcb78a1aba8b252021-07-16T00:11:00ZrusEconomic Research Institute of the Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of SciencesProstranstvennaâ Èkonomika1815-98342587-59572021-07-01172163310.14530/se.2021.2.016-033Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the StateMaksim Evseevich Krivelevich0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9011-8138Economic Research Institute FEB RASAdministrative and tax regimes Free ‘Port of Vladivostok (SPV)’ and ‘Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development (TOR)’ have become a key mechanism for reconciling the interests of the state and investors within the state policy to stimulate the economic development of the Russian Far East. However, significant proportion of projects remains unfulfilled. The state almost always receives less budgetary efficiency than initially planned. The article proposes a model of the coordination of the interests between the investor and the state based on preliminary financial modeling of projects. The interaction between the investor and the state was studied in terms of Game theory. For discrete modeling on the side of the investor it is proposed to use an approach based on Bayes’ theorem. For a one-time assessment of the economic benefits of the project, applied by the state, the technology for evaluation of option’s premium based on the Black-Scholes theorem can be used. For each potential resident of the TOR or SPV, the calculations must be made individually, but the proposed model allows us to draw several general conclusions, which can be applied as we aim to grow the cooperation between investors and the government while using the administrative and tax regimes in consideration. It is recommended to regulate the amount of infrastructure support for projects depending on their expected budgetary efficiency. The development of the government’s strategy of differentiated support for residents of TOR or SPV can change the balance of risks and benefits for potential investors and attract significant amount of foreign direct investment into the economy of the Pacific Russia. For potential TOR residents, the proposed methodology will be useful as a tool to substantiate their claims for state support, which will allow ‘real’ projects to avoid competition for land or electricity with ‘fictitious’ oneshttp://www.spatial-economics.com/images/spatial-econimics/2021_2/SE.2021.2.016-033.Krivelevich.pdfterritories of advanced developmentfree port vladivostokcost-effectiveness of tax incentivespacific russia
collection DOAJ
language Russian
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Maksim Evseevich Krivelevich
spellingShingle Maksim Evseevich Krivelevich
Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the State
Prostranstvennaâ Èkonomika
territories of advanced development
free port vladivostok
cost-effectiveness of tax incentives
pacific russia
author_facet Maksim Evseevich Krivelevich
author_sort Maksim Evseevich Krivelevich
title Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the State
title_short Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the State
title_full Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the State
title_fullStr Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the State
title_full_unstemmed Administrative and Tax Regimes in the Russian Far East: Cooperation between Investors and the State
title_sort administrative and tax regimes in the russian far east: cooperation between investors and the state
publisher Economic Research Institute of the Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
series Prostranstvennaâ Èkonomika
issn 1815-9834
2587-5957
publishDate 2021-07-01
description Administrative and tax regimes Free ‘Port of Vladivostok (SPV)’ and ‘Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development (TOR)’ have become a key mechanism for reconciling the interests of the state and investors within the state policy to stimulate the economic development of the Russian Far East. However, significant proportion of projects remains unfulfilled. The state almost always receives less budgetary efficiency than initially planned. The article proposes a model of the coordination of the interests between the investor and the state based on preliminary financial modeling of projects. The interaction between the investor and the state was studied in terms of Game theory. For discrete modeling on the side of the investor it is proposed to use an approach based on Bayes’ theorem. For a one-time assessment of the economic benefits of the project, applied by the state, the technology for evaluation of option’s premium based on the Black-Scholes theorem can be used. For each potential resident of the TOR or SPV, the calculations must be made individually, but the proposed model allows us to draw several general conclusions, which can be applied as we aim to grow the cooperation between investors and the government while using the administrative and tax regimes in consideration. It is recommended to regulate the amount of infrastructure support for projects depending on their expected budgetary efficiency. The development of the government’s strategy of differentiated support for residents of TOR or SPV can change the balance of risks and benefits for potential investors and attract significant amount of foreign direct investment into the economy of the Pacific Russia. For potential TOR residents, the proposed methodology will be useful as a tool to substantiate their claims for state support, which will allow ‘real’ projects to avoid competition for land or electricity with ‘fictitious’ ones
topic territories of advanced development
free port vladivostok
cost-effectiveness of tax incentives
pacific russia
url http://www.spatial-economics.com/images/spatial-econimics/2021_2/SE.2021.2.016-033.Krivelevich.pdf
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