Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project

Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project

BIM cost, owner's punishment intensity, liquidated damage, size and allocation ratio of incentive pool, Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) gain, loss caused by BIM data resource sharing and other variable parameters are introduced into tripartite evolutionary game model which is established base...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kai Liu, Yufeng Liu, Hongmin Zhou, Yuanyuan Kou, Qiang Ji, Dan Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2021-02-01
Series:Alexandria Engineering Journal
Subjects:
Collaborative behavior
Evolutionary game
Numerical simulation
IPD project
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016820304257
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spelling doaj-aee0c102815c4be99b90ed9b0a0e37852021-06-02T19:59:44ZengElsevierAlexandria Engineering Journal1110-01682021-02-01601373385Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery projectKai Liu0Yufeng Liu1Hongmin Zhou2Yuanyuan Kou3Qiang Ji4Dan Li5Shandong Key Laboratory of Civil Engineering Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China; College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaCollege of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaShandong Key Laboratory of Civil Engineering Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China; College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China; Corresponding authors at: Shandong Key Laboratory of Civil Engineering Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China (H. Zhou).College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaCollege of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaCollege of Earth Science and Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China; Corresponding authors at: Shandong Key Laboratory of Civil Engineering Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China (H. Zhou).BIM cost, owner's punishment intensity, liquidated damage, size and allocation ratio of incentive pool, Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) gain, loss caused by BIM data resource sharing and other variable parameters are introduced into tripartite evolutionary game model which is established based on evolutionary game theory. Tripartite behavioral strategies are analyzed by evolutionary game theory. The stability of system equilibrium and influence of variable parameters on the stability of evolutionary games are discussed. The tripartite dynamic evolutionary game law based on collaborative behavior under the premise of limited rationality is studied. Then, the tripartite game pathways are numerically simulated by using MATLAB software. The influence of initial intention and variable parameters on the process and results of system evolution are analyzed. The dynamic mechanism of owner's supervision on contractor's and designer's collaborative behavior strategies is clarified. It shows that key point of driving participants to choose collaborative behavior is on owner side.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016820304257Collaborative behaviorEvolutionary gameNumerical simulationIPD project
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Kai Liu
Yufeng Liu
Hongmin Zhou
Yuanyuan Kou
Qiang Ji
Dan Li
spellingShingle Kai Liu
Yufeng Liu
Hongmin Zhou
Yuanyuan Kou
Qiang Ji
Dan Li
Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project
Alexandria Engineering Journal
Collaborative behavior
Evolutionary game
Numerical simulation
IPD project
author_facet Kai Liu
Yufeng Liu
Hongmin Zhou
Yuanyuan Kou
Qiang Ji
Dan Li
author_sort Kai Liu
title Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project
title_short Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project
title_full Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project
title_fullStr Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project
title_sort evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project
publisher Elsevier
series Alexandria Engineering Journal
issn 1110-0168
publishDate 2021-02-01
description BIM cost, owner's punishment intensity, liquidated damage, size and allocation ratio of incentive pool, Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) gain, loss caused by BIM data resource sharing and other variable parameters are introduced into tripartite evolutionary game model which is established based on evolutionary game theory. Tripartite behavioral strategies are analyzed by evolutionary game theory. The stability of system equilibrium and influence of variable parameters on the stability of evolutionary games are discussed. The tripartite dynamic evolutionary game law based on collaborative behavior under the premise of limited rationality is studied. Then, the tripartite game pathways are numerically simulated by using MATLAB software. The influence of initial intention and variable parameters on the process and results of system evolution are analyzed. The dynamic mechanism of owner's supervision on contractor's and designer's collaborative behavior strategies is clarified. It shows that key point of driving participants to choose collaborative behavior is on owner side.
topic Collaborative behavior
Evolutionary game
Numerical simulation
IPD project
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016820304257
work_keys_str_mv AT kailiu evolutionarygameandnumericalsimulationofparticipantscollaborativebehaviorinintegratedprojectdeliveryproject
AT yufengliu evolutionarygameandnumericalsimulationofparticipantscollaborativebehaviorinintegratedprojectdeliveryproject
AT hongminzhou evolutionarygameandnumericalsimulationofparticipantscollaborativebehaviorinintegratedprojectdeliveryproject
AT yuanyuankou evolutionarygameandnumericalsimulationofparticipantscollaborativebehaviorinintegratedprojectdeliveryproject
AT qiangji evolutionarygameandnumericalsimulationofparticipantscollaborativebehaviorinintegratedprojectdeliveryproject
AT danli evolutionarygameandnumericalsimulationofparticipantscollaborativebehaviorinintegratedprojectdeliveryproject
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