POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES IN COALITION AND SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT PERIODS: A CASE STUDY ON TURKEY

• Main Author: AHMET EMRAH TAYYAR
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Academica Brâncuşi 2017-12-01
• Series: Analele Universităţii Constantin Brâncuşi din Târgu Jiu : Seria Economie
• Subjects: Political business cycle theories; political monetary cycles; coalition and single party governments; seasonal Box-Jenkins models; central bank autonomy; adaptive monetary policy; Turkey.
• Online Access: http://www.utgjiu.ro/revista/ec/pdf/2017-06/10_Tayyar.pdf

According to the theory of political monetary cycles, the government manipulates monetary policy during election periods in order to be re-elected. According to the said theory, expansionary monetary policies are implemented before the elections with opportunistic objective, while the contractionary monetary policies are implemented to stabilize the economy immediately after the elections. The use of monetary policy instruments for political purposes depends on the presence of a non-autonomous central bank, flexible exchange rate regime in the country, and the coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Thus, the changes in the monetary policy indicators in election periods during coalition and single party governments in Turkey between 1990 and 2016 were examined in the present study. The money in circulation (M0), M1 money supply, domestic loans and inflation series were analyzed with the seasonal Box-Jenkins method for the above mentioned periods. Based on the findings of the study, political monetary cycles were not observed during the 1990-2000 coalition governments. It was determined that there were political monetary cycles during the single party government period between 2000 and 2016.Furthermore, although it could be expected that the political monetary cycles would be removed with the liberalization of the Turkish central bank on 25 April 2001, the existence of political monetary cycles during the period of 2000-2016 indicates that central bank independence was not fully achieved in Turkey. Based on another finding of the present study, the lack of political monetary cycles during the coalition government periods could lead to the failure in financing the budget deficit that increase due to political reasons with monetary policies. However, due to the existence of political monetary cycles during the single party government period, it could be argued that politically induced budget deficits changed in consistence with the monetary policy.