Game Theory Model of Traffic Participants within Amber Time at Signalized Intersection

• Main Authors: Weiwei Qi, Huiying Wen, Chuanyun Fu, Mo Song
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Hindawi Limited 2014-01-01
• Series: Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience
• Online Access: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/756235

The traffic light scheme is composed of red, green, and amber lights, and it has been defined clearly for the traffic access of red and green lights; however, the definition of that for the amber light is indistinct, which leads to the appearance of uncertainty factors and serious traffic conflicts during the amber light. At present, the traffic administrations are faced with the decision of whether to forbid passing or not during the amber light in the cities of China. On one hand, it will go against the purpose of setting amber lights if forbidding passing; on the other hand, it may lead to a mess of traffic flow running if not. And meanwhile the drivers are faced with the decision of passing the intersection or stopping during the amber light as well. So the decision-making behavior of traffic administrations and drivers can be converted into a double game model. And through quantification of their earnings in different choice conditions, the optimum decision-making plan under specific conditions could be solved via the Nash equilibrium solution concept. Thus the results will provide a basis for the formulation of the traffic management strategy.