Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey
In this work I reply to Zoltán Vecsey’s criticisms of the semantic account of fictional names I put forward in Orlando (2017). The main tenet of that proposal is that fictional names refer to individual concepts, which I understand in terms of mental files. In Vecsey (2020), the author presents thre...
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doaj-ad9fd92561644969882961258bafde672021-07-03T10:34:11ZcesUniversity of Presov, Faculty of ArtsESPES1339-11192021-06-011017988184Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán VecseyEleonora Orlando0Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico-CONICET University of Buenos AiresIn this work I reply to Zoltán Vecsey’s criticisms of the semantic account of fictional names I put forward in Orlando (2017). The main tenet of that proposal is that fictional names refer to individual concepts, which I understand in terms of mental files. In Vecsey (2020), the author presents three main objections: (i) no referential shift can be ascribed to fictional names, (ii) fictional names are supposed to play two conflicting functions, and (iii) the mental file framework is incompatible with an antirealist view of fictional objects. Although the objections are deep and thoughtful, the challenge they involve can be met if certain aspects of the proposal are clarified and developed.https://espes.ff.unipo.sk/index.php/ESPES/article/view/210fictional namefictional conceptmental filefictional narrativeantirealism vs. realism about fiction |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
ces |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Eleonora Orlando |
spellingShingle |
Eleonora Orlando Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey ESPES fictional name fictional concept mental file fictional narrative antirealism vs. realism about fiction |
author_facet |
Eleonora Orlando |
author_sort |
Eleonora Orlando |
title |
Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey |
title_short |
Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey |
title_full |
Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey |
title_fullStr |
Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey |
title_full_unstemmed |
Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey |
title_sort |
mental files and the theory of fiction: a reply to zoltán vecsey |
publisher |
University of Presov, Faculty of Arts |
series |
ESPES |
issn |
1339-1119 |
publishDate |
2021-06-01 |
description |
In this work I reply to Zoltán Vecsey’s criticisms of the semantic account of fictional names I put forward in Orlando (2017). The main tenet of that proposal is that fictional names refer to individual concepts, which I understand in terms of mental files. In Vecsey (2020), the author presents three main objections: (i) no referential shift can be ascribed to fictional names, (ii) fictional names are supposed to play two conflicting functions, and (iii) the mental file framework is incompatible with an antirealist view of fictional objects. Although the objections are deep and thoughtful, the challenge they involve can be met if certain aspects of the proposal are clarified and developed. |
topic |
fictional name fictional concept mental file fictional narrative antirealism vs. realism about fiction |
url |
https://espes.ff.unipo.sk/index.php/ESPES/article/view/210 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT eleonoraorlando mentalfilesandthetheoryoffictionareplytozoltanvecsey |
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1721321097072214016 |