A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor Model
This paper studies the effect of uncertain demand on a low-carbon product by using a newsvendor model. With two different kinds of market scales, we examine a game whereby a manufacturer produces and delivers a single new low-carbon product to a single retailer. The retailer observes the demand info...
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/14/11/1276 |
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doaj-aacb375c6c4d43ae836bcd6c68e606d62020-11-25T00:53:00ZengMDPI AGInternational Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health1660-46012017-10-011411127610.3390/ijerph14111276ijerph14111276A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor ModelShaojian Qu0Yongyi Zhou1Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, ChinaBusiness School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, ChinaThis paper studies the effect of uncertain demand on a low-carbon product by using a newsvendor model. With two different kinds of market scales, we examine a game whereby a manufacturer produces and delivers a single new low-carbon product to a single retailer. The retailer observes the demand information and gives an order before the selling season. We find in the game that if the retailer shares truthful (or in contrast unreal or even does not share) forecast information with the manufacturer, the manufacturer will give a low (high) wholesale price through the sequence of events. In addition, as a policy-maker, the government posts a subsidy by selling the low-carbon product per unit. The manufacturer creates a new contract with a rebate for the retailer. We also take the consumer aversion coefficient and truth coefficient as qualitative variables into our model to study the order, pricing, and expected profit for the members of supply chain. The research shows that uncertain demand causes a the major effect on the new low-carbon product. Thereby, we suggest the retailer should share more truthful information with the manufacturer.https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/14/11/1276low-carbon productnewsvendor modeltrust coefficientconsumer aversion coefficientdemand uncertainty |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Shaojian Qu Yongyi Zhou |
spellingShingle |
Shaojian Qu Yongyi Zhou A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor Model International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health low-carbon product newsvendor model trust coefficient consumer aversion coefficient demand uncertainty |
author_facet |
Shaojian Qu Yongyi Zhou |
author_sort |
Shaojian Qu |
title |
A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor Model |
title_short |
A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor Model |
title_full |
A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor Model |
title_fullStr |
A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor Model |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Study of The Effect of Demand Uncertainty for Low-Carbon Products Using a Newsvendor Model |
title_sort |
study of the effect of demand uncertainty for low-carbon products using a newsvendor model |
publisher |
MDPI AG |
series |
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health |
issn |
1660-4601 |
publishDate |
2017-10-01 |
description |
This paper studies the effect of uncertain demand on a low-carbon product by using a newsvendor model. With two different kinds of market scales, we examine a game whereby a manufacturer produces and delivers a single new low-carbon product to a single retailer. The retailer observes the demand information and gives an order before the selling season. We find in the game that if the retailer shares truthful (or in contrast unreal or even does not share) forecast information with the manufacturer, the manufacturer will give a low (high) wholesale price through the sequence of events. In addition, as a policy-maker, the government posts a subsidy by selling the low-carbon product per unit. The manufacturer creates a new contract with a rebate for the retailer. We also take the consumer aversion coefficient and truth coefficient as qualitative variables into our model to study the order, pricing, and expected profit for the members of supply chain. The research shows that uncertain demand causes a the major effect on the new low-carbon product. Thereby, we suggest the retailer should share more truthful information with the manufacturer. |
topic |
low-carbon product newsvendor model trust coefficient consumer aversion coefficient demand uncertainty |
url |
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/14/11/1276 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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