Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness
Masking schemes are among the most popular countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Realization of masked implementations on hardware faces several difficulties including dealing with glitches. Threshold Implementation (TI) is known as the first strategy with provable security i...
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Ruhr-Universität Bochum
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doaj-aa72c24d445b4882b158a9506c3f60682021-07-09T14:15:19ZengRuhr-Universität BochumTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems2569-29252021-07-012021310.46586/tches.v2021.i3.708-755Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh RandomnessAein Rezaei Shahmirzadi0Amir Moradi1Ruhr University Bochum, Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Bochum, GermanyRuhr University Bochum, Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Bochum, Germany Masking schemes are among the most popular countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Realization of masked implementations on hardware faces several difficulties including dealing with glitches. Threshold Implementation (TI) is known as the first strategy with provable security in presence of glitches. In addition to the desired security order d, TI defines the minimum number of shares to also depend on the algebraic degree of the target function. This may lead to unaffordable implementation costs for higher orders. For example, at least five shares are required to protect the smallest nonlinear function against second-order attacks. By cuttingsuch a dependency, the successor schemes are able to achieve the same security level by just d + 1 shares, at the cost of high demand for fresh randomness, particularly at higher orders. In this work, we provide a methodology to realize the second-order glitch-extended probing-secure implementation of a group of quadratic functions with three shares and no fresh randomness. This allows us to construct second-order secure implementations of several cryptographic primitives with very limited number of fresh masks, including Keccak, SKINNY, Midori, PRESENT, and PRINCE. https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8990Side-Channel AnalysisMaskingHardwareThreshold Implementation |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi Amir Moradi |
spellingShingle |
Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi Amir Moradi Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Side-Channel Analysis Masking Hardware Threshold Implementation |
author_facet |
Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi Amir Moradi |
author_sort |
Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi |
title |
Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness |
title_short |
Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness |
title_full |
Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness |
title_fullStr |
Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness |
title_full_unstemmed |
Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness |
title_sort |
second-order sca security with almost no fresh randomness |
publisher |
Ruhr-Universität Bochum |
series |
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems |
issn |
2569-2925 |
publishDate |
2021-07-01 |
description |
Masking schemes are among the most popular countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Realization of masked implementations on hardware faces several difficulties including dealing with glitches. Threshold Implementation (TI) is known as the first strategy with provable security in presence of glitches. In addition to the desired security order d, TI defines the minimum number of shares to also depend on the algebraic degree of the target function. This may lead to unaffordable implementation costs for higher orders.
For example, at least five shares are required to protect the smallest nonlinear function against second-order attacks. By cuttingsuch a dependency, the successor schemes are able to achieve the same security level by just d + 1 shares, at the cost of high demand for fresh randomness, particularly at higher orders. In this work, we provide a methodology to realize the second-order glitch-extended probing-secure implementation of a group of quadratic functions with three shares and no fresh randomness. This allows us to construct second-order secure implementations of several cryptographic primitives with very limited number of fresh masks, including Keccak, SKINNY, Midori, PRESENT, and PRINCE.
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topic |
Side-Channel Analysis Masking Hardware Threshold Implementation |
url |
https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8990 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT aeinrezaeishahmirzadi secondorderscasecuritywithalmostnofreshrandomness AT amirmoradi secondorderscasecuritywithalmostnofreshrandomness |
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1721310189162856448 |