Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness

Masking schemes are among the most popular countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Realization of masked implementations on hardware faces several difficulties including dealing with glitches. Threshold Implementation (TI) is known as the first strategy with provable security i...

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Main Authors: Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Amir Moradi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2021-07-01
Series:Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Subjects:
Online Access:https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8990
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spelling doaj-aa72c24d445b4882b158a9506c3f60682021-07-09T14:15:19ZengRuhr-Universität BochumTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems2569-29252021-07-012021310.46586/tches.v2021.i3.708-755Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh RandomnessAein Rezaei Shahmirzadi0Amir Moradi1Ruhr University Bochum, Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Bochum, GermanyRuhr University Bochum, Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Bochum, Germany Masking schemes are among the most popular countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Realization of masked implementations on hardware faces several difficulties including dealing with glitches. Threshold Implementation (TI) is known as the first strategy with provable security in presence of glitches. In addition to the desired security order d, TI defines the minimum number of shares to also depend on the algebraic degree of the target function. This may lead to unaffordable implementation costs for higher orders. For example, at least five shares are required to protect the smallest nonlinear function against second-order attacks. By cuttingsuch a dependency, the successor schemes are able to achieve the same security level by just d + 1 shares, at the cost of high demand for fresh randomness, particularly at higher orders. In this work, we provide a methodology to realize the second-order glitch-extended probing-secure implementation of a group of quadratic functions with three shares and no fresh randomness. This allows us to construct second-order secure implementations of several cryptographic primitives with very limited number of fresh masks, including Keccak, SKINNY, Midori, PRESENT, and PRINCE. https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8990Side-Channel AnalysisMaskingHardwareThreshold Implementation
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi
Amir Moradi
spellingShingle Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi
Amir Moradi
Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Side-Channel Analysis
Masking
Hardware
Threshold Implementation
author_facet Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi
Amir Moradi
author_sort Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi
title Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness
title_short Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness
title_full Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness
title_fullStr Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness
title_full_unstemmed Second-Order SCA Security with almost no Fresh Randomness
title_sort second-order sca security with almost no fresh randomness
publisher Ruhr-Universität Bochum
series Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
issn 2569-2925
publishDate 2021-07-01
description Masking schemes are among the most popular countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Realization of masked implementations on hardware faces several difficulties including dealing with glitches. Threshold Implementation (TI) is known as the first strategy with provable security in presence of glitches. In addition to the desired security order d, TI defines the minimum number of shares to also depend on the algebraic degree of the target function. This may lead to unaffordable implementation costs for higher orders. For example, at least five shares are required to protect the smallest nonlinear function against second-order attacks. By cuttingsuch a dependency, the successor schemes are able to achieve the same security level by just d + 1 shares, at the cost of high demand for fresh randomness, particularly at higher orders. In this work, we provide a methodology to realize the second-order glitch-extended probing-secure implementation of a group of quadratic functions with three shares and no fresh randomness. This allows us to construct second-order secure implementations of several cryptographic primitives with very limited number of fresh masks, including Keccak, SKINNY, Midori, PRESENT, and PRINCE.
topic Side-Channel Analysis
Masking
Hardware
Threshold Implementation
url https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8990
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