What’s Wrong with Aim-Oriented Empiricism?
For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, the conception of rationality, and how we go about atte...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Estonian Association of the History and Philosophy of Science
2015-10-01
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| Series: | Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.bahps.org/01_Maxwell-2015-2-01.pdf |
| Summary: | For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new
conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, the conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny. |
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| ISSN: | 2228-2009 2228-2017 |