Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism

Some of Jonathan Dancy's strongest arguments in support of moral particularism depend crucially upon the distinction he draws between three different kinds of relevance relations -- favourers, intensifiers and enablers. In this paper I generalize certain features of Dancy's account of the...

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Main Author:	Mark Vorobej
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	University of Windsor 2012-09-01
Series:	Informal Logic
Subjects:	Jonathan Dancy moral particularism reasons relevance intensifiers enablers
Online Access:	https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3421

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spelling	doaj-a9807032df9649e1aa60e31bc2fc0bf82021-06-14T17:00:52ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2012-09-01323Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral ParticularismMark Vorobej0McMaster UniversitySome of Jonathan Dancy's strongest arguments in support of moral particularism depend crucially upon the distinction he draws between three different kinds of relevance relations -- favourers, intensifiers and enablers. In this paper I generalize certain features of Dancy's account of the different roles that premises can play in moral argumentation. Most significantly, I argue that both intensifiers and enablers play parallel roles within different kinds of (more primitive) supplementation relations. This matters since it is common for people to accept Dancy's account of intensifiers while remaining suspicious of his notion of enablers. But this asymmetrical response, I argue, cannot be justified. This account also generates a simpler and more elegant argument in support of moral particularism.https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3421Jonathan Dancymoral particularismreasonsrelevanceintensifiersenablers
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Mark Vorobej
spellingShingle	Mark Vorobej Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism Informal Logic Jonathan Dancy moral particularism reasons relevance intensifiers enablers
author_facet	Mark Vorobej
author_sort	Mark Vorobej
title	Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism
title_short	Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism
title_full	Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism
title_fullStr	Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism
title_full_unstemmed	Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism
title_sort	moral hybrids, moral relevance and moral particularism
publisher	University of Windsor
series	Informal Logic
issn	0824-2577 2293-734X
publishDate	2012-09-01
description	Some of Jonathan Dancy's strongest arguments in support of moral particularism depend crucially upon the distinction he draws between three different kinds of relevance relations -- favourers, intensifiers and enablers. In this paper I generalize certain features of Dancy's account of the different roles that premises can play in moral argumentation. Most significantly, I argue that both intensifiers and enablers play parallel roles within different kinds of (more primitive) supplementation relations. This matters since it is common for people to accept Dancy's account of intensifiers while remaining suspicious of his notion of enablers. But this asymmetrical response, I argue, cannot be justified. This account also generates a simpler and more elegant argument in support of moral particularism.
topic	Jonathan Dancy moral particularism reasons relevance intensifiers enablers
url	https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3421
work_keys_str_mv	AT markvorobej moralhybridsmoralrelevanceandmoralparticularism
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Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism

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