| Summary: | This article aims to investigate the validity of criticism of what is known as psychologist-transmission communication theory. It is accepted that theories which support the idea that communication is a process of conveying (transmitting) psychological content of the mental states between participants (e.g. theories of Jakobson, Hovland, Newcomb et al.) are examples of the approach. There are doubts about such views, which arise from <br />the assumptions of anti-psychologism and anti-mentalism (such as Frege, Husserl), as well as the rejection of traditional notions of subjectivity in philosophy after the linguistic turn. In order to justify the criticism the <br />position of the “late” Wittgenstein is invoked, according to which communication activities (as well as thinking, understanding etc.) need not be considered as correlated to mental acts. <br />
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