BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINO

Robert Michael Citino is an American history professor, scholar and author specialising in German military history. This extensive work on German military history and the credentials of the author make the book a credible source of information. The book seems biased in depicting the German military...

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Main Author: Cadene Nabbie
Format: Article
Language:Afrikaans
Published: Stellenbosch University 2011-08-01
Series:Scientia Militaria
Online Access:http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/97
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spelling doaj-a83129952f2649ce8fc287e66ec3e5a02020-11-24T22:19:47ZafrStellenbosch UniversityScientia Militaria2224-00202011-08-0138210.5787/38-2-97BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINOCadene NabbieRobert Michael Citino is an American history professor, scholar and author specialising in German military history. This extensive work on German military history and the credentials of the author make the book a credible source of information. The book seems biased in depicting the German military as the best but if one is acquainted with military history, it is a bias that could be justified.<br />Citino states boldly in the introduction that the German invasion of France in May 1940 should be seen as a day that changed the world. The magnificent skill employed by the German military indeed represented a profound contrast to the disease of stalemates infecting militaries before the Second World War. The invasion did not change the world; instead, it brought about an increased awareness of the importance of the operational level of war, a dimension of warfare previously neglected. The German operational effectiveness represented an evolution rather than a revolution in operational thinking. Although revolutions may have specific dates attached to them, evolutions do not. The Germans were successful in adapting their operational thinking to new demands. This adaptation did not occur in May 1940. It was a process which included war simulations and various other developments. Although Citino’s statement that the “world changed in May 1940” and other such statements referring to a “revolution” may be flawed, the rest of the book certainly is not. The “evolutionary” concept is definitely captured throughout the book.http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/97
collection DOAJ
language Afrikaans
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Cadene Nabbie
spellingShingle Cadene Nabbie
BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINO
Scientia Militaria
author_facet Cadene Nabbie
author_sort Cadene Nabbie
title BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINO
title_short BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINO
title_full BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINO
title_fullStr BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINO
title_full_unstemmed BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM: THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE/ROBERT M. CITINO
title_sort blitzkrieg to desert storm: the evolution of operational warfare/robert m. citino
publisher Stellenbosch University
series Scientia Militaria
issn 2224-0020
publishDate 2011-08-01
description Robert Michael Citino is an American history professor, scholar and author specialising in German military history. This extensive work on German military history and the credentials of the author make the book a credible source of information. The book seems biased in depicting the German military as the best but if one is acquainted with military history, it is a bias that could be justified.<br />Citino states boldly in the introduction that the German invasion of France in May 1940 should be seen as a day that changed the world. The magnificent skill employed by the German military indeed represented a profound contrast to the disease of stalemates infecting militaries before the Second World War. The invasion did not change the world; instead, it brought about an increased awareness of the importance of the operational level of war, a dimension of warfare previously neglected. The German operational effectiveness represented an evolution rather than a revolution in operational thinking. Although revolutions may have specific dates attached to them, evolutions do not. The Germans were successful in adapting their operational thinking to new demands. This adaptation did not occur in May 1940. It was a process which included war simulations and various other developments. Although Citino’s statement that the “world changed in May 1940” and other such statements referring to a “revolution” may be flawed, the rest of the book certainly is not. The “evolutionary” concept is definitely captured throughout the book.
url http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/97
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