On the conceptual discontinuity between moral normativity and factuality: a reply to Brito
Brito (2010) proposes a naturalistic analysis of morality, disagreeing with some authors who postulate an insurmountable is-ought gap. Here, we present his main arguments and advance some criticisms to them. Brito’s strategy consists in grounding the normative notion of ought on volitive notions, li...
Main Authors: | Tiago Magalhães, Marcos Silva |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidade Federal de Sergipe
2017-03-01
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Series: | Prometeus: Filosofia em Revista |
Online Access: | https://seer.ufs.br/index.php/prometeus/article/view/6348 |
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