Metaphysics of the cosmological argument and some possible tasks of theistic proofs

There is a prevailing view in the analytic philosophical theology that theistic proofs should be formulated without reference to whatsoever metaphysics, but only relying on the achievements of modern science, especially physics, highlighting its logical structure. The Cosmological argument deserved...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kirill Karpov
Format: Article
Language:Russian
Published: St. Tikhon's Orthodox University 2017-12-01
Series:Вестник Православного Свято-Тихоновского гуманитарного университета: Серия I. Богословие, философия
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Online Access:http://periodical.pstgu.ru/ru/pdf/article/5740
Description
Summary:There is a prevailing view in the analytic philosophical theology that theistic proofs should be formulated without reference to whatsoever metaphysics, but only relying on the achievements of modern science, especially physics, highlighting its logical structure. The Cosmological argument deserved special attention among analytic theologians due to its seeming independence from medieval metaphysics and great variability: there were offered at least three versions of it, which embodies these principles. They are a new version of Aquinas’ Third Way, the so-called generic cosmological argument, both versions are analyzed as were submitted by Stephen Davis, and Kalam cosmological argument developed by William Craig. In this paper, I show that the cosmological argument should not be considered without those metaphysical ideas, within which it was proposed, as it leads to the semantic gaps that can not be resolved only by logical analysis. Analysis of Aquinas’ tertia via and modern versions of the cosmological argument shows that they all contain serious logical and metaphysical errors, which do not allow to accept this arguments. On the basis of this conclusion, I try to formulate the tasks that can be solved by theistic proofs: first of all, it is a rationalization of faith.
ISSN:1991-640X
2409-4692