La fragilità dell'oggetto estetico

<p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: medium;">The problematic notion of the «aesthetic object» prevents us from understanding the real nature of the aesthetic dimension. Therefore, a survey of the aesthetic relation as a cogniti...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lorenzo Bartalesi
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Università degli Studi di Milano 2014-12-01
Series:Lebenswelt: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience
Online Access:http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/Lebenswelt/article/view/4529
Description
Summary:<p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: medium;">The problematic notion of the «aesthetic object» prevents us from understanding the real nature of the aesthetic dimension. Therefore, a survey of the aesthetic relation as a cognitive attitude should take the place of the ontology of the aesthetic object. </span><span style="font-size: medium;">Such a reversal of perspective has the merit of invalidating the essentialist strategy but may result in disregarding the objectual pole of the aesthetic relation and reducing the notion of aesthetic to a psychological purely internal and subjective process or to a symbolic-interpretative relation. How does an object with an economical, ritual, religious or instrumental purpose works when it gets into an aesthetic relation? Recently, socio-cultural and evolutionary anthropologists have proposed some interpretative categories like «agency» or «artification» that face the question with a praxeological rather than semantic approach.</span><span style="font-size: medium;">This paper aims to integrate these notions within a expressivist theory of the aesthetic behavior. Starting from a description of perception as an expressive activity and of the aesthetic attitude as a dynamical interplay between emotion and cognition, the purpose is to propose a theory of how an object works in an aesthetic mode, a theory that must be able to escape both pansemiotism and cognitivist and emotivist subjectivism.</span></span></p>
ISSN:2240-9599