Representing vague opinion

Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly expl...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Daniel J. McKaughan, John M. Drake
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2012-08-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341/24104
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spelling doaj-a6dfc721e7324f2e93385d340113a6202020-11-25T00:25:19ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112012-08-01162341344Representing vague opinionDaniel J. McKaughanJohn M. DrakeCurrent supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither uniform through the range of outcomes we take to be serious possibilities nor abrupt at the edges. http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341/24104Beliefmodels of opinionsubjective probabilitysupervaluationuncertaintyvan Fraassenvagueness.
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Daniel J. McKaughan
John M. Drake
spellingShingle Daniel J. McKaughan
John M. Drake
Representing vague opinion
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Belief
models of opinion
subjective probability
supervaluation
uncertainty
van Fraassen
vagueness.
author_facet Daniel J. McKaughan
John M. Drake
author_sort Daniel J. McKaughan
title Representing vague opinion
title_short Representing vague opinion
title_full Representing vague opinion
title_fullStr Representing vague opinion
title_full_unstemmed Representing vague opinion
title_sort representing vague opinion
publisher Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
series Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
issn 1414-4247
1808-1711
publishDate 2012-08-01
description Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither uniform through the range of outcomes we take to be serious possibilities nor abrupt at the edges.
topic Belief
models of opinion
subjective probability
supervaluation
uncertainty
van Fraassen
vagueness.
url http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341/24104
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