Political instability, economic inequality and social conflict: The case in Italy

• Main Authors: Ippolito Marzia, Cicatiello Lorenzo
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Economists' Association of Vojvodina 2019-01-01
• Series: Panoeconomicus
• Subjects: political participation; social conflict; relative power theory
• Online Access: http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2019/1452-595X1903365I.pdf

Rising economic inequality may produce a contraction of political stability and a spread of social conflict, as suggested by the theory of relative power. Following this approach, participation in the political arena depends on the distribution of incomes, because the relative rich use their power to ensure that the status quo do not change, while the relative poor are likely to abandon the public arena when they realize that their demands will not be discussed. Through the implementation of an index of political stability on the Italian general elections of 2008 and 2013, this study empirically tests whether political instability is linked with economic inequality. The results of the analysis, which examines the sub-regional level, show that the strengthening of economic inequality is a decisive factor affecting the weight of the elites in the determination of economic and political choices, and that it influences the distribution of votes between political blocks. This comes at the disadvantage of the poorest who, aware of their lesser chances to have influence, choose to change the character of their participation.